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This dissertation will examine the current state of our common law in relation to its treatment 
of exemption clauses in contracts, and will focus on recent developments which may augur 
greater scope and a new approach to be taken in future for South African courts to ensure 
fairness and the promotion of substantive justice for contracting parties faced with such 
provisions. Whilst it is acknowledged that exemption clauses are considered to be an integral 
part of most contracts and are used to facilitate the efficient running of businesses, their 
continued use in standard form contracts have been viewed with judicial suspicion and 
scrutiny as the inherent nature of these clauses have the potential to operate unfairly against a 
contracting party by excluding their rights of recourse which they would have otherwise had 
at common law. Public policy has always been a benchmark against which potentially unfair 
contracts terms have been measured however, the advent of the Constitution has brought 
about a new meaning to be prescribed to public policy as the Constitutional Court has 
declared that it is now deeply rooted and informed by constitutional values of dignity, 
equality, freedom and more recently ubuntu which is to infuse the common law principles of 
contract. Despite these developments, the new meaning of public policy and the apparent 
elevation of the spirit of ubuntu as an overarching and founding constitutional value has not 
been fully utilised by courts in a manner which can effectively address these potentially 
unfair, one-sided and abusive exemption clauses by declaring them to be contrary to public 
policy. Notwithstanding legislative acknowledgement and the subsequent  enactment of the 
Consumer Protection Act 2008 which has brought about greater regulation of unfair and 
unconscionable contract terms, it is argued that the testing of potentially unfair and abusive 
exemption clauses against the dictates of public policy and ubuntu in a constitutional context 
may provide the South African courts with a new approach to pursue greater substantive 
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Contractual Exemption Clauses under the South African Constitution: An 
Examination of the Potential Impact of Public Policy and Ubuntu on such 
Provisions   
Section: 1  
Introduction and Methodology  
This dissertation will examine the current state of our common law in respect of its treatment 
of exemption clauses in contracts, and will focus on recent developments which may augur 
greater scope in future for South African courts to ensure fairness and the promotion of 
substantive justice for contracting parties faced with such provisions. Before one can examine 
these issues, however, this introductory section will provide some background to the analysis 
by briefly introducing some important concepts which are inextricably linked to our courts’ 
approaches to and attitudes towards exemption clauses. These concepts include the 
fundamental underlying principles of our law of contract, namely freedom and sanctity of 
contract. They also include discussion of a common setting for such clauses, namely standard 
form contracts. Also, in order to examine the law’s treatment of such provisions, we must 
briefly consider the concepts of public policy and transformative constitutionalism under the 
South African constitutional dispensation. 
In the section that follows I will briefly introduce these concepts by way of providing a social 
and legal context for the analysis. After briefly addressing the methodology to be followed in 
this dissertation, Section 2 will examine exemption clauses more closely. In the latter sections 
of the dissertation I will then address the courts’ treatment of such provisions as well as the 
most recent developments in our law of contract which may serve to facilitate a different 
approach by our courts to exemption clauses in future. First, though, one must consider the 
background to the issues which will be dealt with in more detail in those sections. 
1.1 The social and legal context:   
Traditionally the common law of contract was firmly based on the fundamental principle of 
pacta sunt servanda
1
 and has been characterised by the ideals of freedom and sanctity of 
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 What these ideals translated into is that all individuals who possessed contractual 
capacity were free to make a decision on whether to conclude a contract, with whom they 
wish to contract and to determine the terms that will regulate the contract.
3
 Such contractual 
autonomy reflects the legal concept of consensus which is the basis of South African contract 
law and is important in proving the existence of a contract.
4
 Sanctity of contract on the other 
hand dictates that contractual obligations which have been freely and seriously concluded 




The legal concepts of freedom and sanctity of contract are deeply rooted and form the basis 
of what is known as the “eighteenth and nineteenth century’s classical liberal theory of 
contract”.
6
 The non- interference of the courts and the promotion of contractual autonomy 
and freedom led to the development of a rigid set of rules being applied by the courts.
7
 It was 
considered to be inappropriate for judges to review and police contracts validly entered into 
for compliance with considerations of substantive fairness.
8
 It is said that such an approach 
provided predictability and legal and commercial certainty
9
 as courts first and foremost 
concerned themselves with formal validity of a contract rather than its substance.
10
  It is 
evident that such a dogmatic approach could not last in the face of other competing social 
considerations. Hutchinson
11
 states “while parties might enjoy considerable freedom in 
determining the contents of their contracts, they cannot legitimately expect the courts to 
                                                          
2
 D Hutchison et al The Law of Contract in South Africa, (2009) 21.  
3
 Ibid Hutchinson et al; D Bhana & M Pieterse ‘Towards a reconciliation of contract law and constitutional 
values: Brisley and Afrox revisited’ (2005) 122 SALJ 867. The authors state “freedom of contract epitomizes a 
non-interventionist, individualist approach and that parties are free to decide whether, with whom and on what 
terms to contract”.  
4
 Ibid Hutchinson et al 20; Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 867.  
5
 Ibid Hutchinson et al 21.  
6
 Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 866.  
7
 Ibid Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 867. The author states that “judicial interference was viewed with 
scepticism and that this led to rules being applied almost mechanically with a minimal level of intervention”.  
8
 Cockrell ‘Substance and form in the South African law of contract’ 1991 SALJ 59.  
9
 Hutchison et al 23.  
10
 Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 867.  
11
 Hutchinson et al 23.  
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enforce provisions that are offensive to law, morals, public policy or to broad community 
notions of what is fair and reasonable”.  
A further ideal which underpins the law of contract is that of good faith.
12
 It is an assumption 
of contract law that all contracts entered into are concluded in good faith,
13
 requiring 
contracting parties to conduct themselves in an honest and fair manner and to honour their 
obligations.
14
 According to Bhana & Pieterse
15
 “good faith is reconciled with the value of 
pacta sunt servanda”.  
Recent case law now also suggests that ubuntu may have a new role to play in contract law. 
In Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers,
16
 the Constitutional Court shed 
some light on the interaction and applicability of good faith and ubuntu to the law of 
contract.
17
 Both the majority and minority judges agreed that good faith and the values which 
inform ubuntu are applicable to contractual relations and that ubuntu is a relevant 
consideration to be taken into account as it informs the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Constitution.
18
 It was further confirmed that the “law of contract must lend itself to such 
values as it cannot be confined to common law legal tradition alone”.
19
 This judgment will be 
examined in more depth below.  
The importation of open ended values and ideals such as good faith, public policy, morality, 
ubuntu and reasonableness aids judges with flexibility
20
 to use individual discretion when 
determining the enforceability or validity of a contract and its terms.  A consideration of such 
normative values ensures that the rigid common law principles do not operate in isolation and 
the interests of the society which the law regulates are also valued to prevent or redress any 
                                                          
12
 Hutchinson et al 23. 
13
 Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 867. 
14
 Hutchinson et al 21.  
15
 Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 867.  
16
 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC).  
17
 Ibid.  
18
 Ibid. See the minority judgment of Yacoob J at paras 23-24.  
19
 Ibid.  
20
 Hutchinson et al 23; Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ. The authors state that “courts take on a pragmatic 




harm or unfairness experienced by a contracting party or the public at large.
21
 Strict 
application of the classical liberal theory meant that once it was established that the 
contracting parties freely and voluntarily entered into a contract and that the terms did not 
offend against public policy, the contract would be enforced.
22
 The commonly quoted 
judgment of Innes CJ in Wells v South African Alumenite Company
23
 illustrates this with 
apparent approval:  
“If there is one thing which, more than another, public policy requires, it is that men of 
full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and 
that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and 
enforced by the courts of justice” 
It has increasingly been observed, however, that the classical liberal theory of contract 
however, is out of tune with modern commercial reality as it appears to be based on an 
incorrect assumption that contracting parties always possess real freedom to choose with 
whom and on what terms to contract.
24
 Further, it assumes that contracting parties have 
almost equal bargaining power and are able to engage in negotiations regarding the terms of 
the contract.
25
   
The veracity of these assumptions may be significantly out of step with our current reality. 
Although South Africa is 18 years into a free and democratic society, many of the past 
inequalities created by the Apartheid system are still present. The majority of South Africans 
are either burdened by poverty or else they are illiterate.
26
 These two factors cause consumers 
to be placed in a vulnerable position and as a result are susceptible to being abused by 
contracting parties such as corporations, which may be in a much stronger and superior 
bargaining position.
27
 This is mostly evident in the use of the standard form contract (also 
                                                          
21
 Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 868.  
22
 Hutchinson et al 24.  
23
 1927 AD 69 at para 73.  
24
 Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 883. 
25
 Hutchinson et al 25.  
26
 K Hopkins ‘Standard form contracts and the evolving idea of Private law Justice: a case of Democratic 
Capitalist Justice v Natural Justice’ TSAR (2003) 150, 155. 
27
 Hutchinson et al 25.  
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known as a contract of adhesion).
28
 A strict adherence to the common law principle of 
sanctity of contract may lead to harsh and often oppressive standard form contracts being 
upheld and facilitates the abuse of unequal bargaining power.
29
 The focuses of this paper, 
contractual exemption clauses, are particularly relevant and prevalent in the context of 
standard form contracts. Accordingly, I will include some brief discussion of this much-
maligned form of modern-day contract. 
Standard form contracts were defined by Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier
30
 as “contracts that 
are drafted in advance by the supplier of goods or services and presented to the consumer on 
a take-it-or-leave-it basis, thus eliminating opportunity for arm's length negotiations.”
31
 The 
terms are often imposed and drafted in obscure legalese to suit the best interests of the 
stronger contracting party and, as a result, consumers are mostly unaware of these terms.
32
 
The contracting party in a weaker bargaining position is often rendered powerless having to 
surrender to the terms which have been pre-determined by the stronger party without any 
option of negotiation.
33
 Doubt has been expressed over whether standard form contracts  
should even be considered contracts at all since they go against the very foundation of the 
formation of a contract (that being negotiation and consensus of contractual terms).
34
 It is 
said that these contracts often constitute an “imposition of will rather than mutual consent.”
35
  
In the context of the utilities sector, consumers often do not have a choice of a supplier or 
service provider at all due to the development of monopolies over services such as water, 
electricity and telecommunications.
36
 Consumers become bound by the standard terms and 
                                                          
28
 Hopkins TSAR (2003) 150,153. The author states that: “these contracts were described by the French as 
contracts d’ adhesion and the French term was passed on to English law”. See Friedman Law in a Changing 
Society (1972) 404. 
29
 Ibid Hopkins TSAR (2003) 150,152. 
30
 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) 135.  
31
 Ibid at para 135. 
32
 Sutherland ‘Ensuring contractual fairness in consumer contracts after Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 
(CC) - Part 2’ (2009) Stell Law Review 61. See also Sachs J’s minority judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier supra.  
33
 Hopkins TSAR (2003) 150,153; T D Rakoff  ‘Contracts of adhesion: An essay in Reconstruction’ 1983 
Harvard Law Review 1173. 
34
 Sachs J’s minority judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier supra at para 138.  
35
 Ibid at para 138.  
36
 D McQuoid –Mason et al Consumer law in South Africa (1997) 27.  
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conditions upon which these services are provided and the only real choice the consumer has 
is to decide whether or not to use these services at all.
37
  
Standardised contracts may contain unfair contractual terms such as one-sided exemption 
clauses which can be used throughout specific industries and potentially affect the interests of 
numerous people, but the individual injustice sustained is often considered so small that it is 
futile to seek redress by court action.
38
 These unfair clauses usually harm people who “are too 
poor to pay for the expenses of litigation but are too ‘rich’ to qualify for legal aid...”
39
 
Furthermore, Kotz explains that the resources of a stronger contracting party who imposed 
the unfair clause are usually much more substantial than those of the other contracting party, 
that this results in a situation where the stronger party may simply buy off the other side to 
keep the matter out of court.
40
 This may have significant implications for access to justice and 
the rule of law. 
On a more positive note, the use of standardised contracts no doubt has brought with it 
convenience, in that transactions can now be concluded more speedily and without the need 
for time consuming individual negotiations.
41
 In reality most consumers are pre-occupied 
with their daily activities and it is usually considered impractical for consumers to go 
shopping around for the best contractual terms.
42
 Most consumers usually expect speedy and 
convenient service and simply do not have the time or money to engage the services of 
attorneys to review their contract before signing it.
43
 The use of these contracts has also been 
described as a ‘cost-saving tool’ precisely because they contain standard terms, thereby 
eliminating the need to engage lawyers for legal drafting of a new contract with individual 
terms for each new contract concluded.
44
 
                                                          
37
 McQuoid –Mason et al (1997) 27.  
38
 Comments made by Prof Hein Kotz in the South African Law Commission Project 47 Discussion Paper 65 
‘Unreasonable Stipulations of Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts’ (1998) at 19.   
39
 Ibid at 19.   
40
 Ibid at 19.   
41
 Hutchinson et al 25.  
42
 Sutherland (2009) Stell Law Review 53.  
43
 Ibid 53. 
44
 Hopkins TSAR (2003) 150, 153.  
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Further benefits of the use of standard form contracts include large corporations being able to 
draft wide terms which take into account all possible scenarios, thereby minimizing risk.
45
 
Although standardised contracts possess these (and other) benefits, they are still subject to 
being abused by stronger parties in the contractual relationship.
46
 A party in a superior 
bargaining position may use such standardised contracts to exploit consumers by imposing 
unfair terms.
47
 “At the stroke of a pen or a painting of a sign on a wall”,
48
 consumers enter 
into contracts with terms which they may hardly understand or have reconciled their minds 
to. Most of the time they are unaware that they have become bound by a contract and have 
waived their common law rights which would normally have been afforded to them.
49
  
Consumers become bound as a result of the caveat subscriptor principle, which means “let 
the signatory beware”.
50
 This principle postulates that a party who signs a document becomes 
bound to all terms contained in it as a result of their signature even if they are unaware of 
such terms.
51
 In the case of contract terms which do not require a signature for assent, the 
courts have also formulated special rules relating to tickets and notices, which closely 
approximate the caveat rule. However, there are instances were one may escape from the 
caveat subscriptor rule.
52
 These exceptions include iustus error, fraud, undue influence and 
duress and require the signatory to be able to show that s/he created no reasonable impression 
that s/he intended to be bound.
53
 The caveat subscriptor rule is premised on the reliance 
theory, which is often still explained with reference to Blackburn J’s well-known dictum 
from the English case of Smith v Hughes
54
: 
                                                          
45
 Ibid Hopkins TSAR (2003) 150, 154.  
46
 Hutchinson et al 26.  
47
 CC Turpin ‘Contract and Imposed terms’ (1956) SALJ 144,146.  
48




 R H Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5
th
 ed. (2006) 174-176.  
51
 Should someone fail to make themselves aware and read what is in the contract then in terms of George v 
Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A) as per Fagan CJ at paras 472 -473 he is “taking the risk of being bound 
by it and he cannot then be heard to say that his ignorance of what was in it was a justus error”; Burger v 
Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571, 578; Turpin (1956) SALJ 144, 149. 
 
52
 T A Woker ‘Caveat Subscriptor: How careful are we expected to be’? (2003) 15 SA Merc LJ 110.  
53
 Ibid Woker.  
54
 1871 LR 6 QB 597, 607.  
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‘If whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man 
would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party, and that 
other party upon that belief enters into the contract with him, the man thus conducting 
himself would be equally bound as if had intended to agree to the other party’s terms’.  
When one considers the continued aptness in a modern setting of the above-mentioned 
assumptions which underlie the classical liberal theory of contract, as well as the potential for 
substantial injustice to result from archaic notions of the sanctity of contracts, one may also 
be confronted with what may be termed a ‘perfect storm’ or confluence of contractual 
mechanisms with a high probability of harming the interests of the unsuspecting consumer or 
other contracting party. Standard form contracts often contain exemption clauses which seek 
to “exclude, alter or limit the liability that normally flows from contractual relations”.
55
 For 
this reason, exemption clauses have been viewed with judicial hostility, suspicion and 
criticism.
56
 These clauses have the potential to be exploitative and to operate unfairly against 
contracting parties in a weaker bargaining position.
57
 Exemption clauses are nevertheless, 
generally, perfectly valid and enforceable and parties who have voluntarily entered into a 
contract which contains an exemption will be held bound to it unless the clause is deemed to 
be contrary to public policy.
58
  
The courts’ treatment of public policy over the years has recognised that it is not a static 
concept. In South Africa today all law, including the common law of contract, is now subject 
to the Constitution.
59
 In Barkhuizen v Napier,
60
 Ngcobo J (in delivering the majority 
judgment held that “public policy represents the legal convictions of the community; it 
represents those values that are held most dear by the society”.
61
 Further, “public policy must 
                                                          
55
 P N Stoop “The Current Status of the Enforceability of Contractual Exemption Clauses for the Exclusion of 
Liability in the South African Contract Law” (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 496; S Cohen ‘Exemption Clauses’ 2007 
The Professional Accountant 4.  
56
 See McNally JA's view in Transport and Crane Hire (Pvt) Ltd v Hubert Davies & Co (Pty) Ltd 1991 4 SA 
150 (ZS) quoting Lord Denning in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] QB 284 at 
296-7; Stoop (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 496, Cohen (2007) The Professional Accountant 4; S Van der Merwe et al 
Contract: General Principles 3
rd
 ed. (2007) 297. See also H R Hahlo ‘Unfair Contract Terms in Civil-Law 
Systems’ (1981) vol 98 SALJ 70.   
57
 Van der Merwe et al (2007) 297.  
58
 R Sharrock Business Transactions Law (2011) 8
th
 ed 235.  
59
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, (1996) hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”.  
60
 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) 
61
 Ibid at para 28. 
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now be determined by reference to the values that underlie our constitutional democracy as 
given expression by the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Thus a term in a contract that is 
inimical to the values enshrined in our Constitution is contrary to public policy and is, 
therefore, unenforceable”.
62
 In Brisley v Drotsky,
63
 Cameron JA held that “public policy is 
now rooted in our Constitution and the fundamental values it enshrines. They include human 




The new meaning attributed to public policy has come about as a result of transformative 
constitutionalism and its role in changing legal culture.
65
 At the dawn of our new democracy 
the late Etienne Mureinik observed that a true shift from apartheid to a post-apartheid society 
requires a move from a “culture of authority” to a “culture of justification”.
66
 The latter was 
described as “a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be justified; in which 
the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case offered in defence of its 
decisions, not the fear inspired by the force of its command. The new order must be a 
community built on persuasion, not coercion”.
67
 
The Constitution has brought about a change not only in society but a change in the judicial 
community, including judicial attitudes towards traditionally-accepted principles of law.  
Judges are no longer required to make decisions only based on empowering authority. 
Doctrines of public policy and conceptions of fairness, good faith and ubuntu enter the 
spectrum of decision making. This implies the move away from formalism in contracts to the 
promotion of a culture of substantive fairness and equity. It is inevitable that this necessitates 
a review of the classical liberal theory of contract in respect of its adherence to out-dated 
notions regarding parties’ bargaining powers and volition, particularly in the context of 
standardised contracts which contain provisions which may significantly alter a party’s rights 
                                                          
62
 Ibid at para 9.  
63




 See Justice Pius Langa - prestige lecture delivered at Stellenbosch University for an account of the meaning of 
‘transformative constitutionalism’: available at 
http://sun025.sun.ac.za/portal/page/portal/law/index.afrikaans/nuus/2006/Pius%2520Langa%2520Speech.pdf. 
(Accessed on 15 June 2012).  
66
 E Mureinik ‘A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) SAJHR 10, 31-32. 
 
67




or affect its interests. In light of the above, transformative constitutionalism
68
 will underlie 
my approach in this dissertation. I will argue in support of the emergence of a new 
conception of public policy and ubuntu as specific grounds for a substantive equity defence 
against standardised contracts which include exemption clauses.   
Exemption clauses have already been significantly impacted upon by legislation in the form 
of the Consumer Protection Act
69
 in which their use is now more strictly regulated in the 
context of consumer contracts. I shall briefly deal with the important provisions in this Act, 
but my focus will be to argue that exemption clauses which offend against constitutional 
values and the dictates of ubuntu may be deemed to be against public policy (in its 
constitutional context), and as a result may be unenforceable. This may augur a decline in the 
prevalence of inclusion of exemption clauses in standardised contracts and a promotion of 
consumer rights in line with the Consumer Protection Act and the Constitution. 
1.2 Methodology 
I will commence the analysis with discussion, in the following section, of the basic nature 
and characteristics of exemption clauses and how they are judicially viewed and treated in 
South African as well as English Law. South African courts have remained largely influenced 
by English law in the recognition of exemption clauses in contracts and have adopted a 
similar approach in respect of methods by which their effect may be limited if they are 
viewed as being used in an abusive manner or where they may offend public policy.
70
 The 
English judiciary has always viewed these clauses with suspicion and scepticism, especially 
those clauses which seek to take advantage of consumers in a detrimental manner,
71
 and has, 
amassed a wealth of precedent which depicts such judicial sentiments. It is for this reason that 
I have chosen to briefly examine English jurisprudence an example of as the sceptical and 
cautious approach required to be taken in relation to exemption clauses. This approach 
provides a useful background to the later discussion of the potential role of constitutional 
values and public policy in respect of these types of provisions. 
                                                          
68
 For a further discussion of ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ see D Moseneke ‘Transformative 
Constitutionalism’ (2009) Stellenbosch Law Review 3-11.  
69
 68 of 2008. Hereinafter referred to as the “CPA” or the “Act”. 
70
 Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 (AD) 69. 
71
 J McGrath ‘Excluding exclusions in contract law: Judicial reluctance to enforce exclusion clauses’ Cork 
Online Law Review (2006) 13 137, 145.  
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I shall thereafter examine the most relevant and important provisions of the Consumer 
Protection Act and their impact on exemption clauses. I will continue the discussion with an 
examination of relevant case authority regarding the application of the Constitution to 
contractual relations, and will then address whether public policy and ubuntu may have a 
potential role to play in determining the validity and judicial treatment of these clauses. I will 
then examine whether contracting parties are expected to promote the values of the 
Constitution when contracting, and lastly, I will speculate on the potential impact that the 
constitutionalisation of contract law may have on commercial and legal certainty in the 


















Section: 2  
Exemption Clauses in the Law of Contract. 
 
2.1 What are Exemption Clauses?  
Exemption clauses are known by many names. They can be referred to as ‘indemnity 
clauses’, ‘exculpatory clauses’ ‘disclaimers’ or ‘waivers’ and are usually found in 
standardised contracts, displayed on notices or printed on tickets.
72
  For purposes of this 
dissertation, the term ‘exemption clause’ will be utilised. 
The typical wording of an exemption clause may appear as follows:  
“The LESSOR shall not be responsible or liable to the LESSEE for any damage suffered 




“The amenities which we provide at our amusement park have been designed and 
constructed to the best of our ability for your enjoyment and safety. Nevertheless we 
regret that the management, its servants and agents, must stipulate that they are 
absolutely unable to accept liability or responsibility for injury or damage of any nature 
whatsoever whether arising from negligence or any other cause howsoever which is 




Exemption clauses are essentially terms which are used to limit or totally exclude the 
potential liability of a contracting party or parties which would normally arise from 
contractual relations.
75
 They may also serve to exclude or limit other (e.g. common law) 
rights of a party, for example by excluding potential delictual liability. Exemption clauses are 
                                                          
72
 H Lerm A Critical Analysis of Exemption Clauses in Medical Contracts (LLD Thesis 2009 University of 
Pretoria) 8; Stoop (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 496; Cohen (2007) The Professional Accountant 4.  
 
73
 Swinburne v Newbee Investments (Pty) Ltd 2010 (5) SA 296 (KZD). See also Brink, Cohen and Le Roux ‘The 
scope and validity of exemption clauses in contracts’ (2011) Step Ahead First Quarter Newsletter 1-4 for a 
detailed account of this case.    
 
74
 Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA) 988. This exemption 
clause appeared on a window panel which was displayed as a notice to all patrons making use of the amusement 
park and its facilities.  
 
75
 Van der Merwe et al (2007) 297; Stoop (2008) SA Merc LJ 496.  
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not a novel concept in contract law.
76





 as referred to in the writings of Grotius, Voet and Van Leeuwen”.
79
 
With the growing use and convenience of standardised contracting, exemption clauses are 
being used on a wider scale
80
 in contemporary society. In the words of Brand JA in Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom: “nowadays exemption clauses in standard contracts are the rule 
rather than the exception”.
81
 It is now common for consumers to be presented with a standard 
form contract several pages long and often containing exemption clauses printed in small 
print discouraging even the most conscientious and prudent consumer from reading it, and 
which encourages such person to signing the document without reading it.
82
 Even when 




In the setting of a parking lot in a shopping centre or other building, it would be impractical 
to expect the supplier to contract out of liability for damage or theft of the vehicle in the form 
of a contract document
84
 with each and every patron or consumer wishing to make use of the 
parking services. It is for this reason that suppliers often display prominent and conspicuous 
notices at entrances or dispense tickets which contain exemption clauses printed on the back 
by means of an automated push button ticket machine, thereby incorporating the exemption 
clause into the contract for parking services. Apart from parking garages, notices containing 
exclusion or limitation of liability clauses are now displayed in many public places such as 
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stadiums, laundromats, hospitals, shopping malls, cinemas, bars, restaurants, and clubs.
85
 
Service providers are not absolved from the responsibility of drawing such exemption clauses 
to the attention of a consumer.
86
 In an effort to ensure that consumers are aware of the terms 
of the contract before entering into it, the courts have developed a set of rules to be complied 
with before a term can be said to be part of the contract concluded.  
These include:  
 The term must be in contractual form87 
If the exemption clause is contained in a document such as a ticket or a receipt, the document 
must be one in which a reasonable person would expect to find contractual terms such as an 
exemption clause. If the document is one which a person would merely consider to be a 
receipt for money paid then it will not be regarded as a contractual document and any terms 
or clauses therein will not form part of the contract concluded.
88
 
 The term should be contemporaneous with the contract89 
 Consumers cannot be held bound to any contractual terms which are brought to their 
attention after the contract has already been concluded. Clauses which attempt to exclude or 
limit liability will only provide protection to the contracting party if adequate notice is given 
prior to the conclusion of the contract, as “belated notices are considered valueless”.
90
 
Therefore, in the scenario of a parking lot, the notice containing terms and exclusion of 
liability clauses is always situated outside the entrance of the parking lot. The intention is for 
the patron to be made aware of the terms and conditions upon which the parking services are 
being offered before concluding the contract by receiving a ticket from the machine and 
driving into the parking lot.
91
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 Sufficient notification of the term must be given92 
As indicated above, a party wishing to impose contractual terms such as an exemption clause 
must draw such terms to the attention of the other contracting party. If it is not commercially 
practicable to do so, then such terms can only form part of the contract if the contract imposer 
“takes all steps that is reasonably necessary” to ensure that such notice is seen by the 
consumer.
93
 Even if the consumer does not see the notice or does not read the terms 
contained in it, they will be held bound to it if the service provider did what was reasonably 




Exemption clauses are contained in almost every standardised contract from gym 
membership contracts, cell phone contracts, insurance contracts, motor car service 
agreements, rental car agreements, sports event or concert tickets and even receipts. Since the 
introduction of the internet, websites which provide information, statistics, and odds for 
betting will often state by means of a disclaimer displayed on the webpage that no 
responsibility is undertaken for losses caused due to a reliance on the information supplied. 
Regardless of whether an exemption clause is contained in a contractual document or 
displayed on a notice board or computer screen, a common characteristic inherent in the 
nature of these clauses is their potential to operate unfairly against one of the contracting 
parties by limiting their right of redress available under the common law, whilst promoting 
the interests of the other party who is usually in a stronger bargaining position. As Pretorius 
suggests, the very nature of these clauses and their potential to operate unfairly by ousting 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
excluding liability for theft on the part of the hotel displayed at the back of her bedroom door. When items of 
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Despite the often rather draconian tendency of exemption clauses, there are some occasions 
in which their use and enforcement is appropriate and even necessary in the circumstances.
96
 
According to McGrath, although exclusion clauses seem to cheat contracting parties out of 
what they have contracted for, some clauses are nevertheless a necessary evil to ensure the 
effective running of businesses especially ‘procedural exclusion clauses’ which prescribe 
time or notification requirements to facilitate dispute resolution in a timely manner.
97
 
Excluding liability also assists service providers to stay in business and prevents patrons from 
incurring additional costs for the insurance cover required to be taken by the service 
providers should they in fact decide not to exempt themselves from liability for loss, harm or 
injury suffered by the public making use of the services.
98
 
Extreme adventure sports or any recreational activity
99
 which involves a significant increased 
risk of physical harm or inherent danger are generally circumstances in which a service 
provider will be viewed as fairly and necessarily excluding or limiting liability for any loss, 
harm or injury suffered as a result of negligence. In these circumstances a patron is generally 
required to engage in the dangerous activity at their own risk. An exclusion of liability in 
these circumstances are generally considered to be fair and justified as it would be 
unreasonable to expect a service provider to continue to run a business or provide a service if 
he/she were to incur liability for loss, harm or injury sustained by a patron. Furthermore, 
exemption clauses in these circumstances are paramount since such extreme sports or 
recreational activities could probably never be offered if it were not for the use of such 
provisions.  
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 Ibid McGrath (2006) 138.  
99
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While certain exemption clauses are necessary and needed for the continued efficiency of 
running a business or providing a service, a distinction must be drawn between necessary 
exemption clauses and those numerous unnecessary exemption clauses which seek to abuse, 
exploit or take advantage of a consumer.
100
 Examples of such clauses would be those which 
leave consumers with no relief or avenue to seek judicial redress by excluding their common 
law rights or those which explicitly take advantage of a consumer’s weaker bargaining 
position, leaving the consumer with no alternative choice but to accept the terms in the 
contract.
101
 It is these types of exemption clauses which may ultimately offend public interest 
and the dictates of ubuntu and as a result may be struck down for offending public policy. 
 
2.2 Enforceability and Validity of Exemption Clauses 
Contracts which embody exemption clauses and which have been freely assented to by 
contracting parties are as a rule enforced.
102
 The rationale for the recognition of these clauses 
is founded on the common law principle of freedom of contract
103
 and the philosophy of 
laissez-faire (meaning that the law or court will not interfere with the contractual relations of 
people or play a paternalistic role by imposing anything on the parties which did not form 
part of their intentions at contracting),
104
 which prevailed for much of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century.
105
 This is evident from the dictum of Sir George Jessel MR in 
Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson,
106
 where he stated: 
“... If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of 
full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and 
that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred...” 
                                                          
100
 McGrath (2006) 13 Cork Online Law Review 138. 
101
 Ibid McGrath 139.  
102
 Sharrock 8ed (2011) 235.  
103
 Lerm LLD Thesis (2009) 8. 
104
 Ibid Lerm (2009) 9; Hahlo (1981) SALJ 70. See also Sachs J’s minority judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier 
supra. 
105
 Ibid Lerm 9. See also Sachs J’s minority judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier supra . 
106
 (1875) LR 19 Eq 462, 465. 
18 
 
When considering the enforceability of exemption clauses, courts have often been faced with 
challenges based on a claimed lack of consensus between the contracting parties, or 
consensus that has been improperly obtained, or the working of public policy.
107
 A contract is 
void when there is a lack of consensus.
108
 A contract which contains an exemption clause 
may be invalidated in whole or in part should there be a lack of consensus.
109
 This occurs 
when there is a mistake made by the contracting party who denies the existence of the 
contract or denies being bound by the exemption clause (an error in negotio), and where the 
mistake is both reasonable and material.
110
  
In the context of exemption clauses a misrepresentation by non-disclosure may occur in cases 
where such provisions are unexpected, in which cases there is a legal duty on the part of the 
proferens to point out the relevant provision to the other party.
111
 Consensus that has been 
improperly obtained refers to instances of misrepresentation, duress or undue influence.
112
 
Misrepresentation is of importance for the purpose of exemption clauses and it is a ground for 
rescission of any contract.
113
 Of particular importance in respect of challenges to the 
enforcement of exemption clauses as mentioned above is the ground of public policy in 
which an exemption clause can be nullified by the courts if it is to be declared contrary to 
public policy.
114
  Such judicial reasoning was evident even as far back as 1902 in Eastwood v 
Shepstone,
115
 where Innes CJ stated the following:  
“Now this court has the power to treat as void and to refuse in any way to recognise 
contracts and transactions which are against public policy or contrary to good morals. It 
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is a power not to be hastily or rashly exercised; but when once it is clear that any 
arrangement is against public policy, the court would be wanting in its duty if it hesitated 
to declare such an arrangement void”. 
Further, Innes CJ in Morrison v Angelo Deep Gold Mines Ltd
116
 said:  
“Now it is a general principle that a man contracting without duress, without fraud, and 
understanding what he does, may freely waive any of his rights. There are certain 
exceptions to that rule, and certainly the law will not recognise any arrangement which is 
contrary to public policy”. 
The common law of contract has always refused to recognise contracts deemed to be contrary 
to public policy.
117
 This is evidenced by the dictum of Smalberger JA in Sasfin v Beukes
118
  
“No court should therefore shrink from the duty of declaring a contract contrary to public 
policy when the occasion so demands. The power to declare contracts contrary to public 
policy should, however, be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases, lest 
uncertainty as to the validity of contracts result from an arbitrary and indiscriminate use 
of the power...”. 
Public policy generally refers to the interests of society as well as those of the individual 
contracting parties.
119
 As stated above, in Barkhuizen v Napier,
120
 Ngcobo J held that public 
policy represents the legal convictions of the community; it represents “those values that are 
held most dear by the society.”
121
 Furthermore, “public policy must now be determined by 
reference to the values that underlie our constitutional democracy as given expression by the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Thus a term in a contract that is inimical to the values 
enshrined in our Constitution is contrary to public policy and is, therefore, unenforceable”.
122
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Exemption clauses which attempt to exempt a contracting party from liability for fraud,
123
 or 
from liability for intentional breach or wilful misconduct will be deemed to be contrary to 




In Johannesburg Country Club v Stott
125
 the question whether an exemption clause which 
excludes liability for negligently causing the death of another could also be deemed to be 
contrary to public policy was mooted.
126
 The Supreme Court of Appeal however left the 
question open and noted that such an exemption clause would most likely be contrary to 
public policy because it runs counter to the high value that the common law and the 




The permissible limits of exemption clauses therefore are those which exclude liability for 
negligent conduct, or fundamental or material breach of contract.
128
 An exemption clause 
may also exclude liability for gross negligence.
129
 The Consumer Protection Act, however, 
the provisions of which will be discussed in detail below, now statutorily regulates the use of 
exemption clauses. Section 49 essentially requires exemption clauses contained in a contract 
or notice which concern any activity that is subject to risk of an unusual nature in that it 
exempts liability for serious injury or death and is a term or provision which a consumer 
cannot reasonably be expected to be aware of, to be brought to the attention of the consumer. 
In relation to gross negligence, section 51(1)(c)(i) of the Act now strictly prohibits any term 
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2.3 Control of Exemption Clauses  
2.3.1 Common Law Treatment  
A decline of laissez- faire and the augmentation of state paternalism saw the emergence of a 
philosophy of consumerism in which the needs of the poor and illiterate and the prevention of 
their exploitation became necessary.
130
 The past few decades have shown a reversion to what 
has been described as a truly consensual approach to contract law.
131
 Such change has 
occurred not only due to the willingness of judges to overturn established common law 
principles in order to dispense with justice in a more discretionary manner taking into account 
individual circumstances of the case, but it has been coupled with a greater awareness and 
concern of the general society and the state in the regulation of contractual agreements.
132
 
There is now more emphasis on the achievement of a just result than a slavish adherence to 
doctrines established in cases which date back centuries ago.
133
 One area where the need for 
such development may be illustrated is that of standard form contracts, which have a 
tendency to unilaterally introduce terms such as exemption clauses which were never 
expressly part of the bargain and, as a result, a consumer’s will or consensus does not enter 
the spectrum or is simply non-existent.
134
  
Characteristically, these clauses are in tiny print so as to be as inconspicuous as possible with 
the aim of ensuring the most limited prospects of liability to be undertaken by the service 
provider.
135
 Contracts containing these clauses are often disparaged because whilst 
businesspeople are in a position to seek professional legal assistance in the scrutiny of these 
clauses, ordinary consumers on the street cannot afford the same privileges.
136
 In the end, the 
contract concluded hardly ever represents true and real consensus but merely a document 
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which contains contractual terms strongly favourable to one side, affording no benefit or 
advantage to the weaker contracting party whose common law rights have been diminished.  
Since exemption clauses seek to exclude common law rights and obligations of contracting 
parties which would otherwise arise, they have traditionally been viewed with suspicion in 
both South African and English law (and elsewhere), and as a result many methods have been 
developed by courts to limit their effect or invalidate them in appropriate circumstances.
137
 
These include a restrictive and narrow interpretation of such provisions, as well as legislative 
control of exemption clauses.
138
  
Limitation by means of a narrow interpretation is taken if the wording of the exemption 
clause is ambiguous.
139
 This is essentially an application of the contra proferentem rule. If the 
clause is clear and unambiguous, it will generally be enforced.
140
 This rule was explained in 
First National Bank of SA Ltd v Rosenblum,
141
 in which it was stated: 
“In matters of contract the parties are taken to have intended their legal rights and 
obligations to be governed by the common law unless they have plainly and 
unambiguously indicated the contrary. Where one of the parties wishes to be absolved 
either wholly or partially from an obligation or liability which would or could arise at 
common law under a contract of the kind which the parties intend to conclude, it is for 
that party to ensure that the extent to which he, she or it is absolved is plainly spelt out.” 
Scott JA, in Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha,
142
 further explained the 
treatment of exemption clauses as follows: 
“If the language of the disclaimer or exemption clause is such that it exempts the 
proferens from liability in express and unambiguous terms, effect must be given to that 
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meaning. If there is ambiguity, the language must be construed against the proferens... 
the alternative meaning upon which reliance is placed to demonstrate the ambiguity must 
be one to which the language is fairly susceptible; it must not be fanciful or remote”.  
Exemption clauses which are also couched in very wide or general language and which do 
not exclude specific grounds of liability will attract this narrow approach of interpretation.
143
 
Thus if an exemption clause does not exclude liability on specific grounds, the general 
wording should be interpreted as far as possible to have been intended to protect a contracting  
party only against the less extensive liability.
144
 Wide and ambiguous wording of an 
exemption clause could also potentially lead to uncertainty in the contract rendering it 
void.
145
 The Supreme Court of Appeal in both Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock,
146
 and 
Afrox Health Care v Strydom,
147
 held that exemption clauses couched in general terms of 
liability must be construed restrictively.
148
  
The wide usage of exemption clauses in standardised contracts is not unique to the South 
African jurisdiction. In English law, it appears that exemption clauses were, since early days, 
used widely in contracts involving the carriage of goods, where the carrier would use the 
exclusionary clause to exclude his liability for damage to goods being transported.
149
 English 
law has also experienced widespread criticism against the use of exemption clauses. The 
main reason motivating such criticism was that despite the assumption that contracting parties 
usually negotiate the terms of their agreement and do so on equal footing, most of the time 
this is not the case in reality.
150
 More often than not, one of the contracting parties is usually 
in a weaker bargaining position and when the standardised contract contains exemption 
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clauses excluding liability, it often leads to hardship.
151
 Even in the so-called ‘ticket cases’, 
consumers have little time and opportunity to read the exemption clauses, which are usually 
one-sided and act to the disadvantage of the consumer.
152
 
In light of the above-mentioned problems with the use of these clauses, the English courts 
also adopted a few mechanisms to curb the detriment experienced by consumers subjected to 
such clauses.
153
 These included the rule of incorporation, whereby the courts regarded an 
exemption clause to be ineffective and void if it is not part of the contract, which meant that a 
reasonable notice of the clause had to be given.
154
 Should the exemption clause form part of 
the contract then the courts would apply the rule of interpretation (also known as the rule of 
construction).
155
 This essentially entails the operation of the contra proferentem rule which 
dictates that should there be any ambiguity in a contractual term, then such a term is to be 
construed against the contracting party relying on such term.
156
 Furthermore, the English 
courts adopted an assumption that in a situation of doubt it would be considered highly 




The famously quoted and memorable dictum of Lord Denning
158
 reiterates the hostile attitude 
of English courts towards exemption clauses: 
“None of you nowadays will remember the trouble we had, when I was called to the Bar, 
with exemption clauses. They were printed in small print on the back of tickets, order 
forms and invoices... they were held to be binding on any person who took them without 
objection. No one ever did object. He never read them or knew what was in them. No 
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matter how unreasonable they were, he was bound. All this was done in the name of 
‘freedom of contract’... faced with this abuse of power, by the strong against the weak, 
by the use of the small print of the conditions, the judges did what they could to put a 
curb on it. They still had before them the idol, ‘freedom of contract’. They still knelt 
down and worshipped it, but they concealed under their cloaks a secret weapon. They 
used it to stab the idol in the back. This weapon was called ‘the true construction of the 
contract’... But when the clause was itself reasonable and gave rise to a reasonable result, 
the judges upheld, at any rate when the clause did not exclude liability entirely but only 
limited to a reasonable amount”.  
Lord Denning, as far back as 1957 in the case of Anglo- Saxon Petroleum Co Ltd v 
Adamastos Shipping Co Ltd,
159
 stated: 
“We have repeatedly refused to allow a party to a contract to escape from his just 
liability under it by reason of an exemption clause, unless he does so by words which are 
perfectly clear, effective and precise”.  
Even though reference is made to these English cases, it remains relevant for South African 
law as the same approaches have been applied in South African contract law.  
2.3.2 Legislative Treatment  
The use and potential abuse of exemption clauses is controlled by both courts and the 
legislature.
160
 Legislative control over abusive exemption clauses is considered as a vital tool 
in many foreign jurisdictions, with many countries promulgating specific legislation to curb 
the abuse of unfair contractual terms which have arisen out of non-negotiated contracts.
161
 In 
English law, common law measures to control exemption clauses and unfair contract terms 
soon became unnecessary as the legislature stepped in and enacted the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977, and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1994,
162
 to serve as 
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measures directing courts to declare exemption clauses void in certain circumstances.
163
 The 
Act was promulgated subsequent to the English and Scottish Law Commission’s report
164
 
which investigated and made recommendations.
165
 In numerous provisions of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act, reliance is placed on the concept of ‘reasonableness’ as the standard of 
control and guidelines are provided to determine reasonableness of a contractual provision.
166
 
Exemption clauses excluding liability for bodily injury or death as a result of negligence of a 
supplier are prohibited outright in terms of section 2(1) of the Act.
167
 Section 3 of the Act 
provides that exemption clauses relating to breach of contract become subject to review only 
if they form part of standard business terms or if the other contractant deals as a consumer.
168
  
South African law, however, remained largely unaffected by such developments 
elsewhere.
169
 Should parties possess full contractual capacity and the wording of the 
exemption clause is clear and unambiguous, then contracting parties are required to accept 
and live with what they have agreed to be bound to unless the clause is contrary to public 
policy.
170
 Hahlo, however, observed that while pacta sunt servanda remains the rule, 
numerous safeguards for the unsuspecting and the poor have become engrafted on it by both 
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legislation and innovative judicial lawmaking.
171
 With regards to legislation in South Africa, 
there has been no general Act regulating the use of exemption clauses in standardised 
contracts,
172
 but there have been specific provisions in various pieces of legislation 
prohibiting the inclusion of exemption clauses.
173
 However, the need for legislation to control 
unfair and unconscionable contract terms had been voiced by judges and the South African 
Law Commission
174
 in their 1998 Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the 
Rectification of Contracts.
175
 The discussion paper was sought to elicit public response 
regarding the introduction of a proposed piece of legislation (Unfair Contractual Terms Bill) 
which sought to essentially grant the power of review to courts to “remedy contracts or 
contractual terms that are unjust or unconscionable... so as to avoid the injustices which 
would otherwise ensue”.
176
 Exemption clauses had been specifically identified as provisions 
that should receive the “critical attention of the legislature” whilst the research team 
“proposed a review of, but not a witch-hunt against exemption clauses”.
177
 It was stated that 
exemption clauses did in fact have a legitimate place however; they should not be tolerated 
where an implementation of them would lead to harsh and unfair results.
178
 
SALC’s project 47 marked a significant attempt to regulate contractual provisions which 
were unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable,
179
 but a thorough analysis of the report is 
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beyond the scope of this dissertation. The recommendations and findings of the Commission 
are indicative of the shift in public policy from the automatic and mechanical implementation 
of standard term contracts and contractual volition to an approach which shows greater 
concern and consideration for notions of fairness, good faith and the relative bargaining 
position of the contracting parties in order to achieve contractual fairness in the interest of 
both parties to the contract. It can hardly be disputed that such a shift is in keeping with 
constitutional values and the communal spirit of ubuntu.
180
 Unfortunately the 
recommendations made in the report have to date not been implemented by the legislature. 
Nevertheless South Africa recently saw the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act in 
2009, which brought about a significant codification of consumer protection and appears to 
incorporate a number of the principles advocated in the SALC report in the consumer 
context. 
2.3.2.1 The Consumer Protection Act  
Legislation protecting consumers against unfair contract terms has been long overdue in 
South Africa.
181
 Existing protection measures for consumers had become outdated and 
fragmented.
182
 The Consumer Protection Act was promulgated on 29 April 2009.
183
 As the 
name suggests, the Act is responsible for protecting the interests of all consumers, ensuring 
accessible, transparent and efficient redress for consumers who are subjected to abuse or 
exploitation in the marketplace and to giving effect to internationally recognised consumer 
rights.
184
 Section 3 sets out the purposes of the Act and what it aims to achieve. The Act 
seeks to mainly protect the social and economic welfare of not only consumers but, more 
importantly, vulnerable consumers.
185
 Consumers are likely to be considered vulnerable when 
they have a low income, cannot speak English or come from a non-English speaking 
background, have poor literacy and numeracy skills, are very young or old or have an 
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intellectual, physical, or neurological disability.
186
 In South Africa, financial vulnerability 
amongst consumers has become a growing concern.
187
 Many consumers are experiencing 
difficulty in their cash flow which leads to borrowed financing along with high interest 
rates.
188
 Consumers are also reported to be financially illiterate or have little knowledge in 




The Act has a wide field of application and applies to every transaction occurring within 
South Africa for the supply and promotion of goods and services unless specifically 
exempted from the applicability of the Act.
190
 The Act provides for and recognises a number 
of fundamental consumer rights in Chapter 2. These include the right to equality in the 
consumer market,
191
 the right to privacy,
192
 right to choose,
193
 right to disclosure and 
information,
194
 right to fair and reasonable marketing,
195
 right to fair and honest dealing,
196
 
right to fair, just and reasonable contract terms and conditions
197
 and, lastly, the right to fair 
value, good quality and safe goods.
198
 Relevant provisions concerning the use of exemption 
clauses will be focused on below. 
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Under the umbrella right to disclosure and information the Act provides for a specific right to 
information in plain and understandable language.
199
 Any document, notice or visual 
representation produced for the consumer must be produced or displayed in a form which is 
compliant or prescribed by the Act.
200
 Should there be no prescribed form then such 
information must be presented in plain and understandable language.
201
 Plain and 
understandable language means that it is reasonable to conclude that an ordinary consumer in 
the class of persons for whom such notice or document  is intended, with average literacy 




This provision has implications for contracting parties as it is clear that agreements must now 
be drafted in a way which will enable consumers to understand the terms upon which they are 
agreeing to contract and to make an informed choice.
203
 It may also promote a culture of ‘true 
consensus’ in respect of provisions such as exemption clauses, since the consumer would be 
more aware of the limiting contractual provisions allowing them to comprehend such clauses 
and agree to be bound. Such consumer aid is welcome in the consumer sphere as it will also 
create more user-friendly agreements.
204
 Although such provisions constitute a laudable 
effort in ensuring that consumers are aware of the risks undertaken when entering into 
contractual agreements which contain exemption clauses, it has also potentially given rise to 
a negative consequence in relation to a consumer’s common law remedies. If a supplier or 
service provider is strictly required to bring exemption of liability clauses to the attention of 
consumers and has in fact taken steps to do so, then consumers may lose the ability to claim 
ignorance of a provision such as an exemption clause (i.e. iustus error as an exception to the 
caveat subscriptor rule) in consumer contracts.
205
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The Act under section 40 deals specifically with unconscionable conduct. Unconscionable 
conduct has been defined as displaying a character such as contemplated in section 40, or 
other improper unethical conduct that would shock the conscience of a reasonable person.
206
 
Section 40(1)(a)-(d) provides that a supplier or an agent of the supplier must not use  physical 
force, undue influence, pressure, duress or harassment, unfair tactics or any other similar 
conduct against a consumer in connection with the marketing or supply of goods or services. 
Since the common law prohibits undue influence and duress whilst contracting, it is said that 
section 40 has codified the common law and in effect has reinforced the idea that contracting 
parties should contract in good faith and their conduct must not be unconscionable or 
contrary to the boni mores.
207
 Section 40(2) further prohibits unconscionable conduct by 
stating that is unconscionable for a supplier to knowingly take advantage of the fact that a 
consumer was unable to protect their own interests as a result of physical or mental disability, 
illiteracy, ignorance, inability to understand the language of an agreement, or any other 
similar factor.
208
 These provisions ensure that consumers cannot be taken advantage of as it 
takes into account the realities of consumers in South Africa and the fact that many of them 
are illiterate or ignorant.
209
 It also imposes a burden on suppliers to ensure consumers 
understand the terms and conditions contained in the contract. 
One of the specified aims of the Act is to protect consumers against unconscionable, unfair, 
unreasonable, unjust or improper practices.
210
 Section 48 of the Act titled ‘unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust contract terms’ gives effect to such objective. Firstly, a supplier 
cannot supply, offer to supply or enter into an agreement for goods or services at a price or on 
terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust.
211
 Further, a supplier cannot market, negotiate 
or enter an agreement for the supply of goods or services in a manner that is considered to be 
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unfair, unjust or unreasonable.
212
 Section 48 also prohibits a supplier from requiring “a 
consumer or other person to whom any goods or services are supplied at the direction of the 
consumer to waive any rights, assume any obligations or waive any liability of the supplier 
on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust”.
213
 This last, of course, may hold significant 
potential to curb the use of widely-drafted and one-sided unfair exemption clauses in 
consumer contracts and may even render their inclusion in contracts impractical as it will be 
void in terms of the Act.  
 
The Act then sets out the conditions under which a transaction, agreement, term or condition 
is considered to be unfair, unreasonable or unjust.
214
 If either of them is (a) excessively one-
sided in favour of any other party other than the consumer;
215
 (b) if the terms or conditions of 
the agreement are so adverse to the consumer that it is inequitable;
216
 or (c) if the consumer 
relied on a false, misleading, deceptive representation or a statement of opinion provided by 
or on behalf of the supplier which was to the detriment of the consumer;
217
 then such terms or 
conditions shall be considered to be unfair, unreasonable or unjust.  In addition, it will also be 
considered unfair, unreasonable, or unjust if (d) the transaction or agreement is subject to a 
term, condition or a notice which is unfair, unreasonable, unjust or unconscionable;
218
 or if 
the fact, nature and effect of the term, condition or notice was not brought to the consumer’s 




Section 49 deals with notice required for certain terms. It prevents an unsuspecting consumer 
from entering into an agreement which contains terms or provisions which may affect their 
rights in a detrimental manner and which are potentially unexpected.
220
 These include terms 
which attempt to limit in any way the liability or risk of the supplier or any other person, a 
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term which assumes the risk or liability to be undertaken by the consumer, a term which 
imposes an obligation on a consumer to indemnify the supplier or someone else for any other 
cause and lastly a term which constitutes an acknowledgement of any fact by the 
consumer.
221
 An example of these terms would include indemnity clauses, owners risk 
clauses, exemption clauses and clauses which state to the effect that no representations were 
made to a consumer in any way.
222
 Therefore should an agreement contain any one of these 
types of clauses, it must be brought to the attention of the consumer in the prescribed form 
and manner, be in plain and understandable language in accordance with section 22 and 
sufficient time and opportunity must be given to receive and comprehend the provision or 
notice .
223
 In addition, should a provision or notice concern any activity or facility subject to 
risk of an unusual character or nature in which its presence cannot reasonably be expected by 
the consumer, which could result in serious injury or death, then the supplier must draw such 




It must be noted that the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act not only impacts on what 
goods and services are offered to consumers but also the manner in which they are offered.
225
 
Suppliers and service providers are now expected to re-examine their contractual documents 
especially any unexpected or unfair exemption of liability clauses which are hidden in tedious 
lengthy small print, with the aim of making these clauses clearly visible. These clauses are 
also expected to be worded in simple form so that consumers can understand them and not be 
presented with legalese. Any contractual terms, including exemption clauses, which appear to 
be excessively one-sided or potentially unfair to the consumer may have to be re-drafted by 
the supplier or service provider.
226
 One may argue that the provisions of the Consumer 
                                                          
221
 Section 49(1)(a)-(d).  
222
 Jacobs et al 2010 (13) 3 357.  
223
 Section 49(3)-(5); Jacobs et al 2010 (13) 3 358. See also Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) 572 (SCA) at 
para 33, in which the Supreme Court of Appeal held that “an exemption clause... that undermines the very 
essence of a contract...should be clearly and pertinently brought to the attention of customer who signs a 
standard instruction form, and not by way of an inconspicuous and barely legible clause” as cited by Stoop 
(2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 499.  
 
224
 Section 49(2) read with 49(3) and 49(5).  
225
 The Consumer Protection Act: ‘helping you to do good business, better’ available at: 
http://www.standardbank.co.za/site/2011/CPA/CPA_long%20version.pdf. (accessed on 30 October 2012).  
226
 Ibid. available at: http://www.standardbank.co.za/site/2011/CPA/CPA_long%20version.pdf. (accessed on 30 
October 2012).  
34 
 
Protection Act have in many respects created onerous burdens on suppliers and service 
providers to ensure their business complies with the Act. A negative consequence is that such 
compliance comes at a cost. No longer can suppliers and service providers present consumers 
with contracts which contain endless provisions typed in a font as Sachs J puts it “sufficiently 
small enough to reduce the costs of the paper used whilst simultaneously discouraging any 
reasonable person from ploughing through it”.
227
  
The cost that suppliers and service providers incur in relation to compliance with the Act 
however, is often sustained by consumers who ultimately pay for greater consumer 
protection.
228
 The Free Market Foundation of Southern Africa critically expressed their views 
in relation to the then Consumer Protection Bill and the issue concerning over-regulation of 
the consumer industry. The foundation was of the opinion that as much as regulation protects 
consumers, it also has the effect of retarding economic growth and imposing heavy 
burdensome expenses on businesses which are ultimately filtered down to the consumer’s 
pockets, especially the poor.
229
 “These may take the form of higher prices, fewer choices, less 
after sale service, or less products and services ... At the end of the day all costs of consumer 
protection are passed onto the consumer and it impacts disproportionately on the poor as they 
pay for consumer protection”.
230
 
Leaving aside the possible objections to strong legislative consumer protection, it bears 
considering the notification provisions of the Act which apply in respect of exemption 
clauses. The Act requires that the consumer, once made aware, must assent to such a 
provision or notice by signing the provision or conducting themselves in a manner which 
indicates that they have acknowledged the notice and are aware of and have accepted the risk 
and provision.
231
 Notice is to be drawn to the consumer by the supplier in a conspicuous 
manner and form, likely to attract the attention of an ordinary alert consumer, to the nature 
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and effect of such provision or notice.
232
 Such notice must be given speedily either before the 
consumer enters the agreement, before beginning to engage in the activity or entering a 




The emphasis which is now placed by the Act on sufficient notification and ensuring that 
important contractual terms which involve an assumption of risk or liability on the part of the 
consumer, may potentially prevent contract deniers from abusing legitimate common law 
defences such as iustus error. If one had to apply the notification requirements in the 
Consumer Protection Act to the Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd
234
 case, it is likely that 
a court will find that the way in which the personal suretyship clause was positioned and 
embodied in the credit application agreement would have significantly fallen short of the 
‘conspicuous manner and form, likely to attract the attention of an ordinary alert consumer’ 
standard set by the Act. In the Brink case, the personal suretyship clause was situated at the 
end of a document entitled ‘credit application form’, amongst a block of other contractual 
terms, not in bold print or depicted in any significantly conspicuous manner such as in red 
ink, led the majority of the SCA to find that  “the manner in which the clause was included in 
the form accordingly did not suffice to alert a signatory to the fact that he was undertaking a 
personal obligation ... and was a trap for the unwary and the appellant was justifiably misled 
by it”.
235
 Under the Consumer Protection Act, the credit application form containing the 
personal suretyship provision in the Brink case would likely be found to be void ab initio for 
failure to bring such suretyship provision to the attention of the consumer in a conspicuous 
manner.
236
 In order to be CPA compliant, the personal suretyship provision should preferably 
be typed in big bold print, in a different colour and possibility as a stand-alone provision so as 
to ensure that a consumer’s attention is drawn to it.   
Section 51 of the Act prescribes a list of prohibited terms, agreements or transactions which 
will be considered void should they purport to mislead, deceive, or subject the consumer to 
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 Further, any terms or agreements which purport to directly or 
indirectly waive or deprive a consumer of their rights, allow a supplier to avoid their duty in 
terms of the Act, authorise a supplier to engage in unlawful activity in terms of the Act or fail 
to do something required by the Act is also void.
238
 Section 51(c) has very important 
implications for exemption clauses. A term or an agreement which exempts the liability of 
the supplier or someone on his behalf for gross negligence is prohibited.
239
 Exemption of 
liability for loss or damage due to gross negligence is now strictly prohibited in South 
African law.
240
 This section also prohibits arrangements or terms which constitute an 
assumption of risk or liability by the consumer, or an imposition of an obligation on a 
consumer to pay for damages.
241
 
It has been claimed that the Consumer Protection Act has not brought about any novel 
protection for consumers which was not already afforded by the common law (for example, 
liability for misrepresentation, duress or undue influence).
242
 The promulgation of the Act 
and the provisions mentioned above, however, ensure that liability for ordinary negligence 
can be excluded provided the exemption clause is worded clearly and that the exclusion is not 
unfair, unreasonable or unjust.
243
 The exemption clause must be brought to the attention of 
the consumer in plain and understandable language before or at the time of contracting.
244
 
What the Consumer Protection Act has ultimately done is promote a greater awareness and 
enforcement of consumer protection in South Africa and it has made it difficult for suppliers 
to rely on exemption clauses to exclude liability for negligence which is clearly unreasonable 
and unfair.
245
 The Act’s provisions will effectively see to the suppression and eradication of 
the use of exemption clauses in contracts which seek to primarily exploit consumers by 
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imposing harsh and unfair terms and conditions upon them.
246
 The Consumer Protection Act 
has now provides consumers with “a far bigger stick to wield over unscrupulous suppliers” 
and it also places a heavier burden on businesses to ensure that they comply with good 
business ethics when dealing with consumers.
247  An important point to make is that society is 
not seeking a total eradication of these clauses since much of the business world, especially in 
a capitalist society like South Africa, requires them to run effectively. The objective is to 
ensure the protection of unsuspecting consumers and the promotion of fairness in contractual 
relations.
248
 Such objectives are in line with the Constitution and the underlying values it 
seeks to achieve.
249
   
2.4 Conclusion 
The preceding sections thus far have set out the legal and social context in which 
standardised contracts containing exemption clauses occur. Having provided this overview of 
the nature and treatment of exemption clauses in the contractual landscape of South African 
law, as well as the potential for significant legislative reform regarding the use of such 
provisions in consumer contracts, the focus will now shift to an analysis of the impact of the 
Constitution on exemption clauses. The influence of the Constitution on the enforceability 
and validity of contractual provisions such as exemption clauses remains a controversial issue 
in both academic and judicial spheres.
250
 Recent case law, however, suggests some 
encouraging developments in the law of contract which suggests that a new meaning is to be 
attributed to public policy which is now deeply rooted in the Constitution.
251
 It appears that 
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there has even been a suggestion that ubuntu has an important role to play in the law of 
contract.
252
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Section: 3  
The Effect of the Constitution on Contract Law  
3.1 Direct and Indirect Horizontal Application of the Bill of Rights to Contract law 
The enactment of the interim Constitution
253
 sparked a debate as to whether the Bill of Rights 
applied vertically (that is, between the state and private individuals) or also horizontally (that 
is, between two or more individuals, for example, in private contractual relations).
254
 A 
further issue concerned whether such application was meant to be direct (meaning a litigant 
could, for example, directly invoke any of the substantive rights in the Bill of Rights) or 
indirectly (meaning that a litigant would be required to rely on the development of the 
common law in that, for example, a contractual provision which infringed a constitutional 




The Constitutional Court, in application of the interim Constitution at that time, declared in 
Du Plessis v De Klerk
256
 that the Bill of Rights did apply to private contractual relations, both 
horizontally and indirectly.
257
 The supremacy clause in section 2 of the final Constitution 
provides that “the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled”. 
Furthermore, section 39(2) provides for the indirect application of the Bill of Rights and 
provides that “when interpreting any legislation and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights”. It has been stated that the purpose of section 39(2) is to ensure that the 
common law is now infused with the values of the Constitution.
258
 Evidently all law, 
including the common law of contract, is now subject to the Constitution and its values,
259
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and “the common law of contract is shot through with open-ended concepts such as good 
faith, public policy and reasonableness.”
260
 These concepts are now informed by the Bill of 
Rights and its underlying values. With regards to a direct horizontal application of the Bill of 
Rights the application clause in section 8 provides as follows:  
“(l) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state. 
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of 
any duty imposed by the right. 
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms 
of subsection (2), a court- 
(a)  in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary 
develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to 
that right; 
and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the 
limitation is in accordance with section 36 (1).” 
 
An interpretation of section 8(2) suggests that not all fundamental rights bind private 
individuals; it will only be binding to the extent that it is applicable.
261
 Section 8(3) makes it 
clear that should a right in the Bill of Rights find application in the private sphere, it will be 
given effect through the development of the common law rather than directly.
262
 The majority 
of the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier
263
 expressed that testing the 
constitutionality of a contract term directly against a right in the Bill of Rights would result in 
many difficulties.
264
 This is because if a contractual term were to limit a constitutional right, 
such limitation would have to be justified under section 36 (limitation of rights clause) of the 
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 Section 36 only permits a limitation of rights if it is ‘in terms of a law of 
general application’, which means it applies to everyone. A contractual provision cannot be 
such a law.
266
  Furthermore, section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution mandates a court to declare 
‘any law or conduct’ which is inconsistent with the Constitution to be invalid to the extent of 
its inconsistency, and the Court expressed the opinion that a contractual term is neither ‘law’ 
nor ‘conduct’ for purposes of this provision.
267
  
As a result, the majority agreed that an indirect application under section 39(2) of the 
Constitution is the correct approach to be taken in consideration of the constitutionality of a 
contractual provision.
268
 Ngcobo J stated: “In my view the proper approach to the 
constitutional challenges to contractual terms is to determine whether the term challenged is 
contrary to public policy as evidenced by the constitutional values, in particular, those found 
in the Bill of Rights”.
269
 Section 39(2) provides the portal for this exercise to be undertaken, 
as the constitutional values are considered and applied in the process of promoting the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
 
As was stated above, according to the traditional approach of our courts, exemption clauses 
were upheld and enforced on account of a strict adherence to the principle of sanctity of 
contract, unless the exemption clause violated public policy. The problem with pre-
constitutional public policy was that it also prioritised the enforcement of a contract to the 
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letter of the law.
270
 According to Sutherland, it appeared that too much emphasis had been 
placed on freedom of contract
271
 and “the sanctity of contract rule became the epitome of 
public policy in contract law”.
272
 This had the direct effect of essentially creating social 
inequalities which in turn allowed for domination and exploitation of weaker contracting 
parties.
273
 The ‘new’, post- constitutional concept of public policy however, is generally 
considered to be significantly welcomed as it is said that public policy, is no longer 
entrenched in the principles of pacta sunt servanda but rather it is now also deeply and richly 
rooted in the underlying values of the Constitution.
274
 A contract or a provision (more 
importantly in this context, an exemption clause) which violates any constitutional values 




Hopkins is in strong agreement with such proposition as he argues that the Bill of Rights is 
incorporated into the Constitution because it represents the values that society holds most 
dear, which is ultimately described as public policy.
276
 For this reason the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights represents the most reliable statement of public policy.
277
 If one is to take 
such a premise seriously, then it must follow that contracts which violate the provisions in the 
Bill of Rights or the values which underlie it should be considered unconstitutional and 
unenforceable for violating public policy.
278
 It is now evident that the Constitution is 
applicable to the law of contract and that it does have a bearing on the enforceability of 
contractual terms, especially exemption clauses.
279
 The Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
                                                          
270
 Sir George Jessel MR in Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson supra at para 465 cited with 
approval in Wells v South African Aluminite Co supra at para 73, Roffey v Catterall, Edwards & Goudre (Pty) 
Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 SA (N) at 505 and Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) at 761; Eastwood v Shepstone 
supra; Burger v Central South African Railways supra; Brisley v Drotsky supra; Barkhuizen v Napier supra; 
Hahlo (1981) SALJ  70; Bhana & Pieterse (2005) 122 SALJ 867.   
271
 Sutherland (2009) Stell Law Review 53.  
272
 K Hopkins ‘The influence of the Bill of Rights on the enforcement of contracts’ (2003) De Rebus. 
273
 Hawthorne ‘Distribution of wealth, the dependency theory and the law of contract’ (2006) SALJ 52. 
274
 Barkhuizen v Napier supra; Hopkins (2007) De Rebus 23. 
275
 Barkhuizen v Napier supra. 
276
 Hopkins (2003) De Rebus, Barkhuizen v Napier supra. 
277
 Barkhuizen v Napier supra, Afrox Health Care v Strydom supra.   
278
 Hopkins (2007) De Rebus 25.  
279
 Ibid 22.   
43 
 
Constitutional Court, however, have been accused of continuing to observe an adherence to 
the sanctity of contract principle, with continuing reluctance to declare contracts which limit 
or infringe constitutional rights unenforceable.
280
 Such adherence may well be based in a 
particular reading of the constitutional values, namely that self-autonomy, which includes 
contractual autonomy and the ability to regulate one’s own affairs even to one’s detriment, is 
considered by the courts to be the very essence of both freedom and dignity.
281
 Despite the 
criticism levelled against the Supreme Court of Appeal for following such an approach, and 
the judicial reasoning in Brisley v Drotsky and Afrox Health Care v Strydom,
282
 the 
willingness of the highest court in the land in both Barkhuizen v Napier and Everfresh Market 
Virginia v Shoprite Checkers to infuse contract law with public policy, in light of 
constitutional values (including the recognition of ubuntu and its role in the promotion of 
contractual fairness between parties), leads one to believe that in the future, a constitutional 
shift in the court’s thinking might be more radical. The potential for courts to make more 
significant use of the new encompassing constitutional value-meaning of public policy and 
ubuntu to strike down unfair and abusive exemption clauses will be discussed below.  
3.2. Case Law on Exemption Clauses and the Constitution  
Since the advent of our Constitutional dispensation in 1994, initial indications showed that 
contract law would also rise to the challenge of aligning itself and becoming congruent with 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution and of re-establishing its principles so as to 
be consonant with the values of freedom, equality and dignity.
283
 Recent judgments, however, 
had indicated that this has not occurred or, at least, not to the extent that some observers have 
been hoping would be the case.
284
 What follows is a brief examination of a few controversial 
judgments handed down by the Supreme Court of Appeal in which it has been called upon to 
rule on the enforceability of exemption clauses in light of the Constitution. These judgments 
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have been widely criticised for displaying a measure of judicial conservatism in respect of the 
application of the Constitution to private contractual disputes, and they may hold some 
lessons for our courts going forward.  
 
3.2.1 Afrox Health Care Bpk v Strydom  
The appellant was the owner of a private hospital to which the respondent had been admitted 
for an operation.
285
 Upon admission the respondent signed an admission agreement which 
contained an exemption clause excluding the liability of the hospital and its employees for all 
negligent conduct.
286
 Negligent conduct of the nursing staff at the hospital caused the 
respondent to suffer injury and damages. The respondent consequently instituted action 
against the hospital for such damages. In defence, the hospital sought to rely on the 
exemption clause contained in the admission agreement. Initially the High Court had found in 
favour of the respondent, but the SCA upheld an appeal against the judgment. 
The SCA held that as far as exemption clauses were concerned, in terms of the common law 
approach exemption clauses could be declared contrary to public policy and as such be 
deemed unenforceable.
287
 Despite such acknowledgement, the court held that there appeared 
to be no evidence indicating that the respondent was in an unequal or weaker bargaining 
position in relation to the appellant at the time of concluding the admission agreement.
288
 It 
was held that in consideration of whether a contractual term was in conflict with the public 
interests, that the values underpinning the Constitution had to be taken into account.
289
 Public 
interest supports that contracts entered into freely and seriously by parties having the 
necessary capacity are required to be upheld and enforced by a court of law, and as a result 
the respondent’s contention that the exemption clause of the hospital which excluded the 
liability for the negligent conduct of its nursing staff was contrary to public interest could not 
be supported.
290
 It was further contended that when a court deals with the enforcement of 
contractual terms, the court has no discretion and does not operate on the basis of abstract 
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considerations such as good faith and bona fides as argued by the respondent, but rather on 
the basis of established legal rules.
291
 It was held further that persons who sign a written 
agreement without reading it do so at their own risk, and will consequently find themselves 
bound by the contractual provisions contained therein as if they had been aware of such terms 
and expressly agreed to it (unless there exists a legal duty to point out certain provisions).
292
 
The respondent’s subjective expectations about what terms a hospital admission agreement 
contained played no role in deciding whether there existed a legal duty to point out such 
clause. What had to be determined was whether, objectively speaking, such an exemption 
clause was unexpected resulting in the duty to have such an exemption clause pointed out.
293
 
The SCA found that the exemption clause was not, objectively viewed, unexpected, and there 
existed no legal duty upon the admission clerk to bring it to the respondent’s attention. 




Bhana and Pieterse submit that the SCA’s reasoning that inequalities of bargaining power do 
not play a role in admission contracts is erroneous and submit that if contracts such as the one 
entered into by Afrox do not warrant greater judicial scrutiny for public policy compliance, 
then “it may seriously be doubted whether any contract would ever qualify as such.”
295
 This 
is because the case concerns a situation where the ability of a patient to contract on or 
negotiate more favourable terms is impaired in light of the reality of the need of medical 
attention and the emotional factors such as fear being experienced.
296
 Even if the ‘would-be 
patient’ does not accept the terms of admission, it would lead to a refusal by the hospital to 
provide medical treatment needed in circumstances where similar institutions are not easily 
accessible or would likely insist contracting on similar terms.
297
 In criticism of the SCA’s 
approach the authors submit that the court did not consider inequality of bargaining power as 
legally relevant and failed to take into account “normative considerations of good faith, 
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fairness and equality that were at play in the circumstances”.
298
 Based on a “limited notion of 




Naude and Lubbe further have criticised the reasoning of the SCA in the Afrox decision.
300
 
The authors submit that the court erred in finding that the exemption clause contained in the 
medical admission agreement was not unexpected as “a clause which purports to vary the 
consequences of the contract in a manner contrary to the essence of the contract by 
undermining the reciprocity between the essential obligations envisaged by the parties is 
‘surprising’... a party may reasonably expect the terms of a written document to be consistent 
with the typical purpose of the envisaged contract... if this expectation is contradicted by the 
document, it is certainly surprising and there is ... a legal duty to point it out...”.
301
 The 
essence of the contract in this case entailed that the hospital and its medical staff would act 
with a “degree of care and skill reasonably expected of a medical service provider” and a 
clause which essentially purports “to exempt the service provider from liability for lack of 
such skill is contrary to the essence of the agreement...”.
302
  
As a result, an exemption clause contained in a medical agreement effectively allows a 
hospital to provide medical service that is substantially different from that envisaged by the 
parties to the contract especially the would-be patient, “namely the provision of 
professionally acceptable medical care”.
303
 The authors further submit that the SCA merely 
treated the medical contract like any other commercial transaction and failed to take into 
account policy considerations relating to a medical contract.
304
 They criticise that the 
approach adopted by the SCA “overlooks the foundations of the medical profession – that of 
a caring relationship between a health care worker and a patient... and as such a contract to 
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obtain medical care is not a simple commercial transaction”.
305
 As a result an exemption 
clause which excludes all liability for injury to a patient in a hospital admission agreement 
ought to be regarded as void as it “erodes the patients trust” in the service provider who 
appears to be more concerned with commercial interests than the provision of professional 




It is submitted that the Afrox decision highlights the dismay experienced by many consumers 
who often are required to enter into admission medical agreements which are laden with 
widely worded exemption clauses due to the increased risk of potential litigation being 
brought against a hospital as a result of the potential negligence of its medical and nursing 
staff. Unfortunately, in practice, many people that are in need of medical care or emergency 
treatment do not have time to go shopping around for better medical-admission contract 
terms and will often out of desperation and concern for their health or that of others (for 
example, a minor child), speedily sign an admission contract and with it lose their rights of 
recourse. This case represents an example of how harsh, dangerous and oppressive the 
implementation of an exemption clause can be on a contracting party.   
Yet another decision considered in the Supreme Court of Appeal concerning the 
enforceability of an exemption clause in light of the Constitution and public policy was that 
of Johannesburg Country Club v Stott.
307
 
3.2.2 Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another  
The respondent and her late husband were members of the appellant golf club.
308
 Whilst 
playing golf at the club a rain storm occurred and Mr Stott sought shelter under a cover of 
some sorts when lightning struck him. He was left severely injured and later passed away as a 
result of his injuries.
309
 The respondent, Mrs Stott, sought to hold the country club liable for 
her loss as she alleged that her husband had been killed as a result of their negligence.
310
 Mr 
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and Mrs Stott, however, as members of the club were bound by the club membership rules 
which contained an exemption clause exempting liability for personal injury or harm 
caused.
311
 The golf club sought to rely on the exemption clause, whilst Mrs Stott pleaded that 
she was not bound by such clause because she had not been aware of it.
312
 The question to be 
decided by the court was whether the exemption clause absolved the club from liability for a 
dependant’s claim.
313
 The case had essentially been argued and reasoned on the common law 
approach to exemption clauses and the meaning attributed to the words ‘personal injury or 




The SCA held that in answering the above question, Mr Stott as a member of the club could 
not relinquish the autonomous claims of dependants.
315
 Personal harm caused did not include 
a dependant’s claim for loss of support but rather a claim for financial loss.
316
 More 
importantly, Harms JA held that to permit an exclusion of liability for damages for 
negligently causing the death of another would be against public policy as it runs counter to 
the high value the common law and the Constitution places on the sanctity of life.
317
 
Interestingly, the court requested the parties to provide them with argument on the above but 
decided that on a proper reading of the exemption clause there was no need to consider such 
arguments and the appeal was subsequently dismissed.
318
 Harms JA was quick to caution that 
he did not wish to create the impression that he was lending support to the conception that an 
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exclusion of liability for negligently causing an individual’s death is necessarily contrary to 
public policy or constitutional values.
319
 
An analysis of these two judgments indicates that the SCA acknowledged that public policy 
is now deeply rooted in the Constitution. According to Hopkins, however, despite such 
acknowledgement the court remained hesitant and seemingly unwilling to actually declare 
contracts which limit constitutional rights unenforceable.
320
  In both Afrox and Stott the SCA 
chose to question the enforceability of exemption clauses against the Bill of Rights but later 
dismissed or found it to be inapplicable against constitutional scrutiny.
321
 As a result, in both 
cases the exemption clauses were not tested adequately against the Constitution.
322
 The SCA 
thereafter adopted a similar approach in Brisley v Drotsky as discussed below.  
 
3.2.3 Brisley v Drotsky 
Brisley concerned the validity of a non-variation clause in a lease agreement in which any 
variations to the terms or conditions of the contract were required to be recorded in writing 
and assented to by the contracting parties in order to be valid. The landlord in bad faith 
attempted to cancel the lease agreement and eject the tenant from his property for failing to 
pay rent despite orally granting the tenant a period of grace and extended time to pay. The 
tenant had sought to argue that the written lease agreement should not be enforced as its 
implementation in light of the oral variation granted would be unreasonable, unfair and 
contrary to public policy as informed by the values which underlie the Constitution. The SCA 
rejected the tenant’s arguments and chose to uphold the well know Shiferen principle,
323
 
which invalidates any oral variations if not committed to writing and assented to by the 
parties to the contract. The SCA also found that the lease agreement was a contract freely 
negotiated and entered into and that it should thus be upheld. Bhana and Pieterse argue that 
the SCA’s failure to take into account the inequality of bargaining power when entering into 
a lease agreement, ignores the fact that in reality, standard-form lease agreements are drafted 
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in a manner whereby the “obligations of the lessee are usually more pressing than those of the 
lessor” affording the lessor maximum protection.
324
 Furthermore, in relation to exemption 
clauses, the authors submit that “whilst the lessor is exempted from liability for damage 
suffered by the lessee from any cause whatsoever, the lessee is liable to compensate the lessor 
for any damage to the property...”
325
 The Brisley case highlights the fact that even in a simple 
lease agreement which many South African consumers enter into on a daily basis, the non-
variation clause exempting the landlord from liability under a verbal variation of the contract 
illustrates how dangerous, one-sided and unfair an exemption clause can potentially be in 
operation against a weaker contracting party such as the tenant in this case.  
3.2.4 Napier v Barkhuizen  
Shortly after the controversial reasoning in Afrox and Brisley, the case of Napier v 
Barkhuizen was decided by the SCA. The case involved the inclusion of a time bar clause 
restricting an insured from bringing any civil action against an insurance provider, unless 
such action is brought within 90 days of rejection of a claim, and essentially amounted to an 
exemption clause as it effectively takes away potential liability of the insurer under a pre-
existing ground (the insurance contract) and prohibits the insured from access to court to 
prove liability (thereby also limiting the constitutional right of an individual who wishes to 
have a dispute settled in a court of law regardless of the source of that right).  
Cameron JA endorsed the approach taken by the same court in both Brisley and Afrox in 
recognising that the common law was now subject to the Constitution and that courts were to 
take into account fundamental constitutional values of equality, dignity and freedom when 
developing the common law of contract in accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Constitution.
326
 The SCA however, warned that this did not mean judges now had the 
power to strike down contracts or declare them unenforceable based on their subjective 
perceptions of fairness, justice or good faith but that they should declare contracts or their 
terms unenforceable when they were contrary to public policy as informed by the values 
which underlie the Constitution.
327
 It is submitted that insurance contracts are notorious for  
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being drafted in such a manner so as to ensure that the insurer is equipped with all possible 
mechanisms in order to repudiate a claim, and the time bar clause in Barkhuizen is again an 
illustration of how unfair and one-sidedly detrimental these types of provisions can be to a 
consumer. While our courts have on many occasions recognised the benefits and positive 
aspects of both statutory and contractual time bar provisions, one must ask whether a 90 day-
limitation such as that found in a standard form contract in Barkhuizen’s case is reasonable 
and fair. In South Africa it is hardly a stretch of the imagination to assume that many working 
class people do in fact pay monthly premiums towards some kind of insurance whether it is 
for their motor vehicles or households. Therefore in the context of commercial reality 
millions of consumers who are in a weaker bargaining position in relation to large insurance 
companies can potentially be affected negatively and subjected to these potentially unfair, 
one-sided clauses that may very well limit their constitutional rights. 
Despite the court’s recognition of the importance of constitutional values however, it once 
again reaffirmed its adherence to the classical liberal theory by adopting a laissez-faire 
interpretation.
328
 The court found that the constitutional values of dignity and freedom inform 
contractual autonomy and the individual’s ability to regulate their own affairs.
329
 Contractual 
autonomy coupled with the principle of sanctity of contract led to the insurance contract in 
Barkhuizen’s case being upheld as a legitimate, voluntarily concluded contractual agreement, 
and the time bar clause was not found to be unfair or unreasonable.
330
  As discussed above, 
the matter finally ended in the Constitutional Court where the constitutionality of the time bar 
clause was tested. The Constitutional Court confirmed that public policy had to be 
determined with reference to the constitutional values and if a contractual term violates a 
constitutional value it would by definition be contrary to public policy and unenforceable.
331
  
In light of the above judgments it is necessary to consider the ‘new’ role of public policy and 
constitutional values, specifically in respect of the future treatment of contractual exemption 
clauses by our courts. 
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3.3 Constitutional values and their application to exemption clauses 
Both the Supreme Court of appeal and the Constitutional Court have confirmed that 
constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality inform public policy and that 
contractual provisions (including exemption clauses) which infringe a constitutional value 
can be struck down or declared unenforceable in terms of the common law for offending 
public policy. In the context of contracts, constitutional values of freedom and equality may 
be implicated when the relative bargaining positions of the contracting parties are 
considered.
332
 A typical non-negotiated standard form contract containing exemption clauses 
provides a good illustration of a potential situation in which the constitutional values of 
freedom and equality may be severely undermined and potentially violated since a 
contracting party may be held bound to non-negotiated terms on a take- it- or- leave- it basis 
and the only real exercise of freedom the contracting party has is the choice to accept and 
assent to a contract wholly and subject to its exemption provisions, or to not contract at all.
333
  
In light of the above, a natural conclusion to be made is that standard term contracts which 
contain exemption clauses may undermine and violate constitutional values and should 
therefore be vulnerable to a finding of being unenforceable or void for being contrary to 
public policy. This proposition is supported by Cameron JA in Napier v Barkhuizen in which 
the SCA recognised that when a plaintiff, as a result of a significantly unequal bargaining 
power, is forced to contract on terms which infringe their constitutional rights to equality and 
dignity it may be necessary for a court to develop the common law of contract in order to 
invalidate such term.
334
 The counter- argument to such a proposition, however, will always be 
that contractual autonomy also embodies the constitutional values of freedom and dignity and 
that respect is to be afforded to consenting adults in the exercise of such contractual 
autonomy and subsequent conclusion of contracts even if it that contract is to their 
detriment.
335
 Such an approach is squarely in line with the one adopted by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in the cases mentioned above. It appears that not all standard form contracts 
containing exemption clauses which undermine freedom and equality are unenforceable and 
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that not every case of inequality in the bargaining power which is a commercial reality should 
result in a judicial sanction, since legal certainty would be compromised.
336
 But where it is 
evident that the enforcement of the contract containing the exemption clause is unduly one-
sided, harsh or unconscionable, then such sanction may be necessary in light of public 
policy.
337
 This proposition is duly supported by the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v 
Napier
338
 as per the majority judgment of Ngcobo J in which the test for fairness of a 
contractual term is considered. In order to determine the fairness of a contractual term, the 
court stated that two questions needed to be answered. “The first question was whether the 
clause itself was objectively unreasonable, and secondly, if it were found to be reasonable, 
then whether it should be enforced in the circumstances”.
339
 Further citing with approval the 
Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa and Another case,
340
 the SCA unanimously found 
that “a clause which had merely a tendency, rather the than the result of depriving a party of 
the right to approach a court for redress was inimical to public policy”.
341
 Accordingly, the 
two- stage test for fairness adopted in the Barkhuizen case allows a court to first examine 
whether a contractual term is objectively reasonable. Should the court find that it is, the 
second enquiry is whether it should be enforced in the particular circumstances relevant to the 
case and relevant to the relative situation of the contracting parties.
342
 The court went on to 
state that in the Afrox case, “although the Court found ultimately that on the facts there was 
no evidence of an inequality of bargaining power, this does not detract from the principle 
enunciated in that case, namely that the relative situation of the contracting parties is a 
relevant consideration in determining whether a contractual term is contrary to public policy. 
I endorse this principle. This is an important principle in a society as unequal as ours”. 
 
The Constitutional Court in addition stated that “Public policy imports the notions of fairness, 
justice and reasonableness and would preclude the enforcement of a contractual term if its 
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enforcement would result in an injustice”.
343
 Further, “while public policy endorses the 
freedom of contract, it nevertheless recognises the need to do simple justice between the 
contracting parties. To hold that a court would be powerless in these circumstances would be 
to suggest that the hands of justice can be tied; in my view the hands of justice can never be 
tied under our constitutional order”.
344
 In respect of the two-stage test for fairness of a 
contractual provision, Sachs J and Moseneke DCJ, in their dissenting minority judgments 
preferred a more objective approach to the second question and stated that “public policy 
cannot be determined at the behest of the idiosyncrasies of the individual contracting 
parties”.
345
  However, they both agreed that fairness and reasonableness is the correct 
approach to be adopted in determining whether the contractual provision if enforced would 
be contrary to public policy.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
Judicial reasoning on the part of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the cases mentioned above 
call for a reiteration of the fact that the Constitution is now the supreme law of South Africa. 
All law including the common law of contract is now subject to constitutional control.
346
 
Despite initial indications of a smooth transition, the SCA has displayed an unsettling 
reversion to the preferred classical theory of contract law and a general antagonistic attitude 
towards the infiltration of constitutional values and broader notions of equity, fairness and 
good faith which have been held to now inform public policy.
347
 Like all other areas of South 
African law, contract law is also required to “re-establish itself in a constitutional 
dispensation” but the SCA has displayed its unwillingness to really do so in cases such as 




 Despite recognising the need for the 
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common law of contract to be infused with constitutional values, the SCA has done so in a 
manner which places “values of equality and dignity purely within a classical liberal 
understanding of contract law”.
350
 It is submitted that this approach cannot be said to be in 
consonance with the general spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights and the intended 
application of public policy in a constitutional context. The SCA has been criticised for 
merely paying lip-service to the incorporation and consideration of constitutional values.
351
 In 
addition, Lubbe argues that “The judgments in Brisley and Afrox buttress freedom and 
sanctity of contract constitutionally, on the basis of values of freedom, dignity and 
equality”.
352
 This last is a dangerous development in the view of those who have called for 
less rigid adherence to the principle of sanctity of contract, and who support greater 
substantive justice in our law of contract.  
The consequence is that public policy as informed by constitutional values is not adequately 
being utilised in a manner which can be effectively used to address potentially unfair contract 
terms or one-sided, oppressive and abusive exemption clauses, by declaring them to offend 
public policy. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court has indicated that apart from 
constitutional values being infused with public policy, other ideals such as ubuntu, which 
embodies numerous values and notions of good faith, justice, morality, equality and dignity 
(to name a few), may also be implicated as relevant notions which require equal 
consideration in determining the fairness of contracts and their provisions. It is submitted that 
ubuntu as infused with the new meaning of constitutional public policy may have a 
significant role to play in the review of the validity of exemption clauses and as a potential 
standard against which these clauses are to be tested in order to determine whether they 
violate the dictates of public policy. Since the anticipated shift in judicial thinking and the 
transition and development of the common law of contract to reconstitute itself in a 
constitutional era has been arguably slow,
353
 it is submitted that the growing trend towards 
the recognition and elevation of the spirit of ubuntu may provide an alternative mechanism to 
which the constitutionality of exemption clauses contained in standard term contracts may be 
tested. The suggestions made in the South African Law Commission report Project 47 and the 
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subsequent promulgation of the Consumer Protection Act represent evidence of a powerful 
legislative will and apparent persistence to combat unfairness in consumer contracts, 
especially in respect of exemptions clauses. These efforts per se are a  powerful indication 
and representation of the current status of public policy in the context of contract law and the 
concerns over unfair exemption clauses contained in standard form contracts. It is within this 
climate of consumer protection against abusive, unfair exemption clauses that ubuntu may 




















Section 4  
Post-Constitutional Public Policy 
4.1 Public Policy incorporating Ubuntu and Good faith 
Apart from constitutional values, the effects of a contract or its provisions on the individual 
interests of contracting parties also play a role in determining whether contracts and their 
provisions are to be considered contrary to public policy.
354
 The need to encourage the doing 
of simple justice between contracting parties and addressing inequality of bargaining power 
are both considered to be in the public interest.
355
 When Ngcobo J stated that “public policy 
takes into account the necessity to do simple justice between individuals and that it is 
informed by the concept of ubuntu”,
356
 it appeared that notions of good faith in contractual 
dealings and ubuntu are to be applicable to contract law.
357
 It is possible that incorporation of 
this latter concept into contract law may serve to ensure the achievement of greater 
contractual fairness and the promotion of equality between contracting parties. Unfortunately, 
however, the ideal of ubuntu is not easy to define,
358
 and I need to briefly consider the 
content of this principle. Mokgoro has defined it as follows:  
 
“Ubuntu is a philosophy of life, which in its most fundamental sense represents 
personhood, humanity, humaneness and morality; a metaphor that describes group 
solidarity where such group solidarity is central to the survival of communities with a 
scarcity of resources, where the fundamental belief is that motho ke motho ba batho 
babangwe/umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu which, literally translated, means a person can 
only be a person through others. In other words the individual’s whole existence is 
relative to that of the group: this is manifested in anti-individualistic conduct towards the 
survival of the group if the individual is to survive. It is a basically humanistic 
orientation towards fellow beings”.
359
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There are various interpretations and descriptions of ubuntu.  Some define ubuntu as the 
moral quality of what makes up a person whilst others view it as a philosophy, a phenomenon 
or an ethical world view according to which we are all as persons interconnected.
360
 Ubuntu 
is said to be a novel concept that is not static and is highly susceptible to change.
361
 Despite 
being regarded as a purely ethnic African ideal or philosophy with its origins in the Bantu 
language, ubuntu is said to be a worldly view.
362
 According to Mokgoro, its meaning is to be 
viewed in a social context which encompasses “group solidarity, conformity, compassion, 
respect, human dignity, human orientation and collective unity as the key social values”
363
 
which make up ubuntu. Similar descriptions have been made by Nussbaum, who describes 
ubuntu as follows:  
 
“The capacity in African culture to express compassion, reciprocity, dignity, harmony 
and humanity in the interests of building and maintaining community with justice and 
mutual caring. Ubuntu... speaks to our interconnectedness, our common humanity and 
the responsibility to each other that flows from our deeply felt connection. Ubuntu is 
consciousness of our natural desire to affirm our fellow human beings and to work and 




Recently, Lamont J in Afri-Forum and Another v Malema and Others
365
 expressed a 
comprehensive understanding of ubuntu as follows: 
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“Ubuntu is a concept which is to be contrasted with vengeance; dictates that a high value 
be placed on the life of a human being; is inextricably linked to the values of and which 
places a high premium on dignity, compassion, humaneness and respect for humanity of 
another;... dictates good attitudes and shared concern; favours the re-establishment of 
harmony in the relationship between parties and that such harmony should restore the 
dignity of the plaintiff without ruining the defendant;... operates in a direction favouring 
reconciliation rather than estrangement of disputants; works towards sensitising a 
disputant or a defendant in litigation to the hurtful impact of his actions to the other party 
and towards changing such conduct rather than merely punishing the disputant; promotes 
mutual understanding rather than punishment; favours face-to-face encounters of 
disputants with a view to facilitating differences being resolved rather than conflict and 
victory for the most powerful; favours civility and civilised dialogue premised on mutual 
tolerance”. 
 
Ubuntu has also been described by Archbishop Desmond Tutu as follows:  
“Ubuntu speaks particularly about the fact that you can't exist as a human being in 
isolation. It speaks about our interconnectedness. You can't be human all by yourself, and 
when you have this quality – ubuntu – you are known for your generosity. We think of 
ourselves far too frequently as just individuals, separated from one another, whereas you 
are connected and what you do affects the whole world. When you do well, it spreads 
out; it is for the whole of humanity”.
366
  
According to Maluleke, “pre colonial and pre- apartheid African culture, traditions and 
customs were based on ubuntu.”
367
 Despite colonialism and imperialism, the living nature of 
customary law saw the survival of the African ideal of ubuntu.
368
 “Ubuntu underscores the 
importance of agreement or consensus”.
369
 The concept of ubuntu made its debut in South 
African legal discourse in the 1993 Interim Constitution.
370
 Thereafter, it became part of 
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judicial precedent in the Constitutional and High Courts.
371
 Recently, there has been debate 
about the potential role it may play in modern contract law in balancing out the excesses and 
dominance of the principle of freedom of contract, also acting as a vehicle in the development 
of contract law to promote fairness in contracting between parties.
372
 According to Bennett, 
however, its application in the field of contract law proved to be arduous since the common 
law already had mechanisms to deal with the issues to which ubuntu may be applied.
373
 An 
example of these was the former exceptio doli generalis which it was generally assumed 
provided a remedy and could be utilised to address unfairness in contractual terms, declaring 
them unenforceable.
374
 In 1988, a majority of the then Appellate Division in Bank of Lisbon 
and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas
375
 held that the exceptio doli generalis had never been part 
of Roman-Dutch law and was thus never received into modern South African law.
376
 Harms 
DP expressed his views concerning the exceptio doli generalis in Bredenkamp v Standard 
Bank,
377
 and stated the obiter footnote in Crown Restaurant read with Barkhuizen gave some 
the impression that the Constitutional Court had revived the exceptio doli generalis 
defence.
378
 This is because the formulation of the defence in Barkhuizen is said to be very 
similar to the exceptio doli generalis.
379
 Although the Constitutional Court has recognised the 
possible defence of unfair or unreasonable enforcement of a contract being contrary to public 
policy, the Constitutional Court is criticised for failing to define the limit of such a 
defence.
380
 However, Harms DP in examining the history of the execptio states that “the 
majority in Bank of Lisbon... found that the exceptio had not been part of our law. It was part 
                                                          
371
 Ibid 4.  
372
 Hutchinson et al 27.  
373
 Bennett (2011) 14(4) PELJ 4, 13.  
374
 Ibid 16. See also Crown Restaurant CC v Gold Reef City Theme Park (Pty) Ltd 2008 (4) SA 16, 2007 (5) 
BCLR 453 (CC) fn 1.  
375
 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) 607. 
376
 Hutchinson et al 28; Bennett (2011) 14(4) PELJ 4, 16. 
377
 supra.  
378
 Ibid at paras 32- 39. See also G Glover ‘Lazarus in the Constitutional Court: An exhumation of the exceptio 
doli generalis?’(2007) 124 SALJ 499 at 455 and A J Kerr ‘the defence of unfair conduct on the part of the 
plaintiff at the time the action is brought: The exceptio doli generalis and the replicatio doli in modern law’125 
(2008) SALJ 241.   
379
 Hutchinson et al 186.  
380
 Ibid.  
61 
 
of the Roman law of procedure and never a substantive rule, and was used to alleviate the 
strictness of contracts that were not based on bona fides. Since all contracts in our law are 
considered to be bonae fide, the exceptio had no purpose in modern law”.
381
 It is submitted 
that although the defence of unfair or unreasonable enforcement of a contractual term being 
contrary to public policy is similar to the formulation of the defence of the exceptio, it is 
unlikely that the Barkhuizen judgment could lead to a revival of the exceptio doli generalis 
due to its history.
382
   
Despite the demise of the exceptio doli the South African law of contract could still rely on 
the principle of good faith to ensure fairness in contracts.
383
 The common law principle of 
good faith has always been fundamental to our law although it has been afforded limited 
application.
384
 Good faith is said to be a means by which the unlimited freedom of contract 
embodied in pacta sunt servanda can be curtailed.
385
 In Sasfin v Beukes it was argued that 
good faith would serve as a counter-weight in the scale of public policy against freedom and 
sanctity of contract.
386
 As a result, the public interest in adhering to the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda or sanctity of contract had to be balanced against the interest to preserve good 
faith in contractual relations between parties.
387
  
Olivier JA in his minority judgment in Eerste Naionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v 
Saayman,
388
 in approval of such an interpretation, reiterated that there existed a close link 




 succinctly explains Olivier JA’s views as 
follows: “Broadly stated, (the respondent was not bound to the contract she signed) on the 
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basis that in the circumstances of the case, principles of bona fides, equity and good faith 
militated against the strict application of established rules of contract and that, in the event 
the court is entitled to refuse to enforce the terms of the contract between the parties, though 
such enforcement may be dictated by the strict rules of contract law”.
391
 The opinion 
expressed by Olivier JA was subsequently followed by several provincial decisions.
392
 The 
SCA, however, subsequently stated clearly in a line of cases commencing with Brisley v 
Drotsky that “good faith, reasonableness and fairness although fundamental to the law of 
contract, do not constitute independent substantive rules which a court can use to intervene in 
contractual relations; such interference can only be made if permitted by hard law and as such 




Shortly after Brisley, the SCA was tasked with dealing with a similar issue in Afrox v 
Strydom. Strydom attempted to rely on the minority judgment in Saayman, but the court 
confirmed its decision in Brisley that “good faith, and reasonableness and fairness do not 
provide an independent or free floating basis for interfering with contractual relationships”.
394
 
The SCA, in South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd,
395
 again confirmed the 




The significance attributed to Constitutional values such as good faith, fairness and 
reasonableness were again considered by the SCA in Bredenkamp v Standbank 
397
 in which 
Harms DP had to consider the argument put forward by the appellants that the cancellation of 
the bank accounts by Standard Bank in light of an express provision provided for in the 
banking contract although valid, would operate unfairly and unreasonably against them if 
enforced. The appellants argument proceeded on the basis that ‘fairness’ is a core value of the 
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Bill of Rights and that any conduct which is unfair , would be in conflict with the 
Constitution and therefore void.
398
 Harms DP held that “fairness is not a free-standing 
requirement for the exercise of a contractual right... fairness remains a slippery concept as 
was illustrated by the fact that Jajbhay J found that the closing of the account was unfair 
while Lamont J, on basically the same facts, found otherwise.”
399
 This approach was adopted 
by Brand JA in Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd,
400
 whereby the appellants 
sought to argue that the “termination of their leases was in the circumstances, unreasonable 
and unfair and should therefore not be enforced on grounds of public policy”.
401
 Brand JA in 
agreement with the finding of Harms JP found that “reasonableness and fairness are not 
freestanding requirements for the exercise of a contractual right”.
402
  He then extensively 
quoted from the dictum in South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 
403
 stating that:  
 
... “Although abstract values such as good faith, reasonableness and fairness are 
fundamental to our law of contract, they do not constitute independent substantive rules 
that courts can employ to intervene in contractual relations. These abstract values 
perform creative, informative and controlling functions through established rules of the 
law of contract. They cannot be acted upon by the courts directly. Acceptance of the 
notion that judges can refuse to enforce a contractual provision merely because it offends 
their personal sense of fairness and equity will give rise to legal and commercial 
uncertainty”.  
 
The SCA concluded that a court cannot therefore refuse to give effect to a contract simply 
because if such a contract is implemented it will be regarded by the individual judge to be 
unreasonable and/or unfair and “unless the Constitutional Court holds otherwise, the law is as 
stated by this court in SA Forestry Co, Brisley and Bredenkamp”.
404
 As recent as 2012, the 
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SCA in Potgieter & Another v Potgieter No & Others 
405
 reaffirmed the approach adopted in 
Brisley, Bredenkamp, Maphango and SA Forestry Co in finding that good faith, 
reasonableness and fairness do not constitute free standing and independent substantive rules 
to be used to interfere with contractual undertakings.
406
 The court further held that: 
 
“In addition, the reason why our law cannot endorse the notion that judges may decide 
cases on the basis of what they regard as reasonable and fair, is essentially that it will 
give rise to intolerable legal uncertainty... judges may often differ on what is equitable 
and fair. The outcome in any particular case will thus depend on the personal 
idiosyncrasies of the individual judge...if judges were allowed to decide cases on the 
basis of what they regard as reasonable and fair, the criterion will no longer be the law 
but the judge”.     
 
The approach of the SCA was then seemingly confirmed by the Constitutional Court in 
Barkhuizen v Napier, as the court held that “as the law currently stands, good faith is not a 
self-standing rule, but an underlying value that is given expression through existing rules of 
law. In this instance, good faith is given effect to by the existing common law rule that 
contractual clauses that are impossible to comply with should not be enforced”.
407
 However, 
Ngcobo J went on to say that, in the same paragraph that “whether, under the Constitution, 
this limited role for good faith is appropriate and whether the maxim lex non cogit ad 
impossibilia alone is sufficient to give effect to the value of good faith are, unfortunately not 
questions that need be answered on the facts of this case and I refrain from doing so”.
408
 This 
suggests that the door in fact remains open for development and the Constitutional Court has 
not expressly endorsed the approached supported by the SCA that good faith alone can never 
be an independent self-standing rule to counteract a contract entered into. All that the 
Constitutional Court acknowledged is that, that approach reflects how the law currently 
stands.  
    In his minority judgment, Sachs J further makes important remarks concerning the role of 
good faith in contract law. He states that:  
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  “Like the concept of boni mores in our law of delict, the concept of good faith is shaped 
by the legal convictions of the community. While Roman-Dutch law may well supply the 
conceptual apparatus for our law, the content with which concepts are filled depends on 
an examination of the legal conviction of the community - a far more difficult task. This 
task requires that careful account be taken of the existence of our constitutional 
community, based as it is upon principles of freedom, equality and dignity. The principle 
of freedom does, to an extent, support the view that the contractual autonomy of the 
parties should be respected...  But the principles of equality and dignity direct... that 
parties to a contract must adhere to a minimum threshold of mutual respect in which the 
''unreasonable and one-sided promotion of one's own interest at the expense of the other 
infringes the principle of good faith to such a degree as to outweigh the public interest in 
the sanctity of contracts ... oppressive, unreasonable or unconscionable contracts can fall 
foul of the values of the Constitution. In accordance with its constitutional mandate the 
courts of our constitutional community can employ the concept of boni mores to infuse 




He further remarks that in determining whether a contract is contrary to public policy, an 
important consideration to take into account is “the doing of simple justice between man and 
man”.
410
 In consideration of the SALCR’s findings and international legislation, he further 
highlighted that “public policy is more sensitive to justice, fairness and equity than ever 
before”
411
 and that legislation in several European countries have already developed laws 




It is evident that good faith and the principle of doing simple justice between man and man 
are interconnected and interrelated. Good faith when contracting as the Constitutional Court 
has indicated, takes into account the necessity for mutual respect and the promotion of more 
than just one’s individual self interests. As Ngcobo J explained in Barkhuizen, the notion of 
good faith “encompasses the concepts of justice, reasonableness and fairness”.
413
 These 
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fundamental concepts and principles are central to the very essence of what makes up ubuntu. 
However, it evident that the Supreme Court of Appeal makes it clear that good faith alone 
can never be independently employed by the courts to strike down contractual terms which 
are excessively unfair, as may be the case with abusive exemption clauses. This leaves one to 
ask whether recourse by the courts to ubuntu may play a more proactive role in addressing 
the apparent vacuum left by the demise of the exceptio doli and the accepted judicial notion 
of the more limited role of good faith. Bennette suggests that ubuntu is now being used to 
perform functions that go beyond the concepts of good faith and public policy and 
acknowledges that ubuntu does in fact contain good faith and that “it can be realised in 
situations where the courts would refuse to invoke good faith”.
414
 I believe that the case law 
referred to provides a clear indication that there is a need for substantial engagement with the 
issue, especially in respect of contractual exemption clauses.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal on more than three different occasions in the cases discussed 
above were presented with the opportunity to recognise grounds to challenge substantive 
unfairness in contractual provisions, yet the court chose to display a conservative attitude and 
an adherence to the dictates of sanctity of contract.
415
 The continued unwillingness of our 
courts to afford a greater role to good faith in the law contract is indicative of how even more 
dangerous exemption clauses can be to a contracting party who has entered into an agreement 
in which the exemption clause has been incorporated or enforced in possible bad faith. 
For those who have been calling for a greater role for good faith in our law of contract,
416
 it 
appears as though ubuntu may come to its rescue in providing a constitutionally sound 
alternative basis for in the regulation of potential unfair contract terms and exemption 
clauses. Since ubuntu has been recognised by the highest court in the country to inform 
public policy and our constitutional order,
417
 it must therefore follow that contracts or 
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contractual provisions such as exemption clauses which may be unfair and contrary to the 
social values which define ubuntu as described above, may also be deemed to be contrary to 
public policy and thereby unenforceable. I will explore this possibility in what follows. 
4.2 Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers  
I now turn to the case of Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers
418
 and the 
opinons expressed by Yacoob J (minority) and Moseneke J (majority). This case marked the 
first attempt by the Constitutional Court to consider the role and importance of the concept of 
ubuntu in our law of contract. The dispute concerned a clause (referred to as clause 3)
419
 
requiring the parties (Everfresh and Shoprite) to engage in negotiations in relation to the 
renewal of a commercial lease. The appellant argued that the respondent was obliged to make 
a bona fide attempt to agree on the terms of renewal and that the law should be developed in 
terms of the Constitution to oblige parties who undertake to negotiate with each other to do so 
reasonably and in good faith.
420
 The respondent’s counter-argument was that the provision 
was unenforceable because good faith is too vague. Yacoob J in his minority judgment made 
important remarks regarding ubuntu and its interaction with principles of contract, and the 
principle of good faith:
421  
  
“The values embraced by an appropriate appreciation of ubuntu are also relevant 
in the process of determining the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution. 
The development of our economy and contract law has thus far predominantly 
been shaped by colonial legal tradition represented by English law, Roman law 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Constitutional court held: “...The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the 





 Clause 3 read as follows: “Provided that the Lessee has faithfully and timeously fulfilled and performed all 
its obligations under and in terms of this Lease, the Lessee shall have the right to renew same for a further 
period of four years and eleven months commencing on 1st April 2009, such renewal to be upon the same terms 
and conditions as in this Lease contained save that there shall be no further right of renewal, and save that the 
rentals for the renewal period shall be agreed upon between the Lessor and the Lessee at the time. The said right 
of renewal is subject to the Lessee giving written notice to the Lessor of its intention so to renew, which notice 
shall reach the Lessor not less than six (6) calendar months prior to the date of termination of this Lease. In the 
event of no such notice being received by the Lessor, or in the event of notice being duly received but the 
Parties failing to reach agreement in regard to the rentals for the renewal period at least three (3) calendar 
months prior to the date of termination of this Lease, then in either event this right of renewal shall be null and 
void.” 
420
 at paras  9, 16, 19.  
421
 at paras 23-24. 
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and Roman Dutch law... It may be said that a contract of lease between two 
business entities with limited liability does not implicate questions of ubuntu. This 
is, in my view, too narrow an approach. It is evident that contractual terms to 
negotiate are not entered into only between companies with limited liability. They 
are often entered into between individuals and often between poor, vulnerable 
people on one hand and powerful, well-resourced companies on the other. The 
idea that people or entities can undertake to negotiate and then not do so because 
this attitude becomes convenient for some or other commercial reason, certainly 
implicates ubuntu”. 
 
From the above it is patently clear that for Justice Yacoob, the values embraced by an 
appreciation of ubuntu are relevant in the process of determining the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Constitution and that the notion that the concept of ubuntu is not implicated in 
private relations is too a narrow an approach.  He further made an important remark, that the 
“law of contract cannot confine itself to the colonial tradition alone”.
422
 The majority of the 
court, in agreement with Yacoob J’s views, stated that “it is indeed, highly desirable and in 
fact necessary to infuse the law of contract with constitutional values, including the value of 
ubuntu, which inspire most of our constitutional compact”.
423
 The content and meaning of 




“On a number of occasions in the past this Court has had regard to the meaning and 
content of the concept of ubuntu. It emphasises the communal nature of society and 
carries in it the ideas of humaneness, social justice and fairness and envelopes the key 
values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic 
norms and collective unity ... Were a court to entertain Everfresh’s argument, the 
underlying notion of good faith in contract law, the maxim of contractual doctrine that 
agreements seriously entered into should be enforced, and the value of ubuntu, which 
inspires much of our constitutional compact, may tilt the argument in its favour. 
Contracting parties certainly need to relate to each other in good faith. Where there is a 
contractual obligation to negotiate, it would be hardly imaginable that our constitutional 
                                                          
422
 at para 23. 
423
 at para 71. 
424
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values would not require that the negotiation must be done reasonably, with a view to 
reaching an agreement and in good faith”.
425 
 
In light of the above, one may argue that ubuntu, which was a fundamental concept in the 
Interim Constitution, appears to have been brought back to the fore by Moseneke J in the 
current constitutional regime.
426
 It appears that the learned judge equates constitutional values 
with the concept of ubuntu.
427
 Thus, if as stated above in Barkhuizen, any contractual terms 
offending any constitutional values are unenforceable and will be held to be against public 
policy, then so too any contractual term that offends the concept of ubuntu should also be 
found to offend public policy since public policy is said to be informed by constitutional 
values. The CC unfortunately decided that it was “unnecessary to decide the merits of these 
difficult questions”,
428
 and as a result we currently have no judicial authority on how ubuntu, 
as a constitutional value, may be applied in contractual relations.  
 
Since the judgment in Everfresh, legal practioners have levelled criticism against it stating 
that it will introduce uncertainty in the law of contract.
429
 It has been argued, however, that 
elements of uncertainty arise even when the law is applied to rules as opposed to open-ended 
normative values and norms such as ubuntu and good faith.
430
 What is evident thus far is that 
the ideals which make up good faith (i.e. to do simple justice between individuals)
431
 are 
congruent with the notions of ubuntu to ensure fairness between contracting parties. If such a 
premise is accepted then one can agree that ubuntu may play a role in the promotion of good 
faith in contractual relations.  
                                                          
425
 at para 72.  
426
 A Louw - Advanced Contract Law (unpublished Lecture notes, University of Kwazulu- Natal, 2012) 
(‘Fairness, equality, and good faith in contract; unfair contract terms legislation; consumer protection’) 12-13.  
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 Ibid.  
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 at para 73.  
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 See R Green ‘The renewal of leases and Ubuntu’ article by Attorney of Cox & Yeats, 2 available at: 
http://www.coxyeats.co.za/Publications/Staff/4/Roger-Green. (accessed 16 July 2012). The author states: “This 
case whilst noble in its endeavour to introduce the principle of good faith into the interpretation of contracts also 
introduces an element of uncertainty. No longer will it be possible to interpret a contract strictly in accordance 
with the common law or even in accordance with the clear meaning of the words. The concept of ubuntu, not yet 
a clear legal principle, will need to be taken into account”.  
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That in turn shall have a direct impact on the way standardised contracts which contain 
exemption clauses are treated. Excessively unfair and one-sided exemption clauses which 
undermine the dictates of both good faith and ubuntu (i.e. lack of openness, fairness, justice, 
honesty, equality, and which undermine dignity by limiting an individual’s contractual 
autonomy) will arguably in turn undermine public policy. As Kruger states: “the Constitution 
prizes more than one ideal, more than one value and aims for more than just one end”.
432
 
Notions of fairness, justice and equality can no longer be dismissed on the grounds that they 
may potentially give rise to uncertainty.
433
 “The time in which our courts can be shy of policy 
considerations has long since passed”.
434
 Initial uncertainty is to be expected but a marginal 
sacrifice of certainty is worth the potential gains of substantive fairness that can be achieved 
as a result of the constitutionalisation of contract law.
435
 This viewpoint is underscored in the 
SA Law Commission Report of Project 47 where it was stated that: “contractual uncertainty 
is a price that must be paid if greater contractual justice is to be achieved, that certainty is not 




5. Conclusions  
Like all other branches of South African law which had to re-establish their legitimacy in a 
constitutional milieu,
437
 so too the law of contract is subject to the Constitution and its values. 
Accordingly, ubuntu could be viewed as an overarching constitutional value or value system 
which encompasses the other constitutional values which, in terms of constitutional 
supremacy, may serve as a benchmark for adjudication of the constitutionality of private 
contracts and contractual terms. What may be a strong argument in support of the notion that 
ubuntu is a constitutional value is the fact that the founding values of the Constitution (i.e. 
human dignity, equality, promotion of human rights and freedoms, accountability and 
openness) have a close corrolation with several key elements of the current understanding of 
ubuntu (such as human dignity, respect, compassion, honesty, conformity, etc).
438
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Furthermore, the values of group solidarity and collective unity which make up ubuntu can be 
related to the spirit of national unity in the new democratic society of South Africa.
439
 
Ubuntu, it appears, is intrinsically interwined into the spirt of the Constitution. It must be 
reiterated that the potential new role to be played by ubuntu in contracts could mean that 
courts, despite the continued reluctance on the part of SCA, will indirectly ascribe to a much 
more active and prominent role for good faith as the dicates of ubuntu and good faith are 
intrinsically interwined. Good faith has always underlined Roman - Dutch law as it is a 
fundamental principle that “as a matter of good faith, all serious agreements ought to be 
enforced and all contracts are now said to be consensual and bona fidei”.
440
 Ubuntu can be 
similarly said to be reflected as an underlying value in the customary law of contract as it 
requires extensive dicussion and consensus to be reached on terms of the contract between 
the contracting parties. As the Constituional Court has confirmed, ubuntu is a value that 
applies universally including in our Roman-Dutch based common law of contract.  
It can be argued further that in a constitutional dispensation that proclaims the supremacy of 
the Constitution over all law and conduct, which recognises horizontal application of 
fundamental rights and also enjoins the courts to develop the common law in light of the 
spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights, it may be non-negotiable to recognise ubuntu 
as a benchmark for private conduct. Power is often abused in private relations because of our 
socio-economic realities and the capitalist society we live in.  
Davis J in Mozart Ice cream Franchises Pty (Ltd) v Davidoff and Another
441
corroborated this 
viewpoint when he stated that: 
“In our country there should be no need to remind the legal community of the importance 
of power and its abuse, even when sourced in private hands ... Private power in South 
Africa is also accountable to the principles of the Constitution. Madala J reminds us of 
this important point in our history when he wrote in Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk 
and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) ... “Ours is a multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-
lingual society in which the ravages of apartheid, disadvantage and inequality are just 
immeasurable. The extent of the oppressive measures in South Africa was not confined 
to government/individual relations, but equally to individual/individual relations. In its 
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effort to create a new order, our Constitution must have been intended to address these 
oppressive and undemocratic practices at all levels. In my view our Constitution starts at 
the lowest level and attempts to reach the furthest in its endeavours to restructure the 
dynamics in a previously racist society”’.
442
   
Exemption clauses imposed in standard form, adhesionary contracts are one very prevalent 
example of how man is only out to secure his best interests often at the sacrifice of a anothers 
rights. As a result, what may often equate to  a selfish and self-centred, one-sided promotion 
of an individual’s own interests at the cost of the interests of others, should be closely 
interrogated and subjected to the principles and values inherent in ubuntu. In the context of 
the main theme of this dissertation, it bears considering that exemption clauses, by definition, 
generally serve to promote or protect the interests of one (often stronger) contracting party to 
the detriment of the other. One must ask whether this might mean that exemption clauses by 
their very nature and purpose run counter to the central premise of ubuntu, in terms of 
constituting a prominent example of the selfish promotion of individual interests without due 
consideration of the communal interest (in this context, including the interests of the other 
party to the contract). It would appear that the legislature, in enacting the Consumer 
Protection Act, has recognised the dangers in this regard, and that the Act’s provisions 
relating to unconscionable conduct, generally, and to exemption clauses, more specifically, 
may indicate a shift in public policy regarding the use of such provisions. 
In this most unequal society in the world, a vexing question which has to be asked in this 
context is whether the law should allow business expediency or commercial justifications for  
provisions such as often excessively one-sided exemption clauses, or a strict application of 
pacta sunt servanda in circumstances where true, real consensus is often questionable,  to 
outweigh the potential harm, opressiveness and unfairness that can arise when an exemption 
clause is imposed and enforced. Does the often one-sided pursuit of gain of the corporate 
businessman at the cost of potential social injustice often experienced by the poor and 
illiterate or weaker consumer, comply with the value system of ubuntu - which places the 
communal good at the fore - rather than promotion of the self-interest of the individual? It 
could certainly be argued that such a status quo as evidenced by our courts’ rather 
conservative attitude to date to substantive fairness in contract law does not comply with the 
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nature and spirt of ubuntu (let alone the spirt, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution).  
Whilst it is acknowledged that the use of exemption clauses are a valid mechanism which is 
often employed by businesses to serve a legitimate function in the efficiency of the running 
of a business, it is suggested that ubuntu may serve the same function that the 
unconscionabilty test in Sasfin was aimed at. Such an approach would take into consideration 
that not all unfair contracts containing exemption clauses should be declared void and 
unenforceable, but if they are so unfair so as to be viewed as unconscionable then they are 
deemed to offend public policy. By parallel reasoning, ubuntu could similar to the standard of 
unconscionability also serve as the benchmark for excessive unfairness in exemption clauses, 
by curbing the abuse of private power which offends against the principle of communal good 
over self-interest. Where an exemption clause is imposed on a party in a situation of 
significant inequality of bargaining power and the imposition of such term tilts the scales of 
fairness excessively in the favour of the proferens, the imposition and enforcement of such a 
term might constitute the abuse of private power which implicates the value of ubuntu. This 
should make such a provision vulnerable to a declaration of invalidity on the basis of public 
policy. I believe that our courts would be warranted (indeed, required by section 39(2) of the 
Bill of Rights) to examine the viability and desirability of such a proposed approach. This 
would be one way to pursue greater substantive justice in respect of notoriously problematic 
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